Washington State
Foreign Animal Disease
Response Plan

PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE STRATEGIES
This is a draft document focusing on foreign animal disease response strategy and logistics in the state of Washington and is subject to change. This document does not represent national policy nor any policy of the Washington Department of Agriculture. This document is for planning purposes only and is constantly evolving as new information becomes available.
## Record of Changes

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<td><strong>At-Risk Premises</strong></td>
<td>Premises that have susceptible animals, but none of those susceptible animals have clinical signs compatible with the FAD. Premises objectively demonstrates that it is not an Infected Premises, Contact Premises, or Suspect Premises. At-Risk Premises may seek to move susceptible animals or products within the Control Area by permit. Only At-Risk Premises are eligible to become Monitored Premises.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Buffer Zone</strong></td>
<td>The area between the Quarantine Zone and the Infected Zone.</td>
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<td><strong>Contact Premises</strong></td>
<td>Premises with susceptible animals that may have been exposed to the FAD, either directly or indirectly, including but not limited to exposure to animals, animal products, fomites, or people from Infected Premises.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Control Area</strong></td>
<td>Consists of an Infected Zone and a Buffer Zone.</td>
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<td><strong>Free Area</strong></td>
<td>Area not included in any Control Area. Includes the Surveillance Zone.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Free Premises</strong></td>
<td>Premises outside of a Control Area and not a Contact or Suspect Premises.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Infected Premises</strong></td>
<td>Premises where a presumptive positive case or confirmed positive case exists based on laboratory results, compatible clinical signs, case definition, and international standards.</td>
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<td><strong>Infected Zone</strong></td>
<td>The area extending 10 KM (6.2 mile) around the Infected Premises.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Initial Decision Group</strong></td>
<td>The group that makes initial decisions when a presumptive positive diagnosis of a FAD is made. The Initial Decision Group includes the State Veterinarian, a Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostician, and others.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>MAC-G</strong></td>
<td>Multi-Agency Coordination Group</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Monitored Premises</strong></td>
<td>Premises objectively demonstrates that it is not an Infected Premises, Contact Premises, or Suspect Premises. Only At-Risk Premises are eligible to become Monitored Premises. Monitored Premises meet a set of defined criteria in seeking to move susceptible animals or products out of the Control Area by permit.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>NAHLN</strong></td>
<td>National Animal Health Laboratory Network</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Negative Premises</strong></td>
<td>Premises on which all are designated negative for a FAD.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>NVSL</strong></td>
<td>National Veterinary Services Laboratory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Quarantine Zone</strong></td>
<td>The area including both the Infected Zone and the Surveillance Zone.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Restricted Premises</strong></td>
<td>Premises under surveillance, including infected premises that have been depopulated, cleaned, and disinfected, and/or dangerous contact premises when there are no signs of infection and at least 30 days after shipments to or from an infected premises.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Stamping Out (OIE definition)</strong></td>
<td>Means a policy designed to eliminate an outbreak by carrying out under the authority of the Veterinary Authority the following:</td>
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a. the depopulation of the animals which are affected and those suspected of being affected in the herd and, where appropriate, those in other herds which have been exposed to infection by direct animal to animal contact, or by indirect contact with the causal pathogen; this includes all susceptible animals, vaccinated or unvaccinated, on infected establishments; animals should be killed in accordance with Chapter 7.6;
b. the destruction of their carcasses by rendering, burning or burial, or by any other method described in Chapter 4.12;
c. the cleansing and disinfection of establishments through procedures defined in Chapter 4.13.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Surveillance Zone</th>
<th>Zone outside and along the border of a Control Area. The Surveillance Zone is part of the Free Area.</th>
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<tr>
<td>Suspect Premises</td>
<td>Premises under investigation due to the presence of susceptible animals reported to have clinical signs compatible with the FAD. This is intended to be a short-term premises designation.</td>
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<tr>
<td>USDA APHIS VS</td>
<td>United States Department of Agriculture, Animal Plant Health and Inspection Services, Veterinary Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>USDA AVIC</td>
<td>United States Department of Agriculture Area Veterinarian in Charge for the Animal Plant Health and Inspection Service, Veterinary Services Program, or designee</td>
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<tr>
<td>USFWS</td>
<td>United States Fish and Wildlife Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>WADDL-AHFSL</td>
<td>Washington Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory - Avian Health and Food Safety Laboratory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WADDL-Pullman</td>
<td>Washington Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory - Pullman laboratory</td>
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<tr>
<td>WDFW</td>
<td>Washington State Department of Fish and Wildlife</td>
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<td>WDOH</td>
<td>Washington State Department of Health</td>
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<td>WSDA</td>
<td>Washington State Department of Agriculture</td>
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<td>WSU</td>
<td>Washington State University</td>
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Overview

The Washington State Department of Agriculture (WSDA), in cooperation with the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), has developed infrastructure and plans to address outbreaks of a Foreign Animal Disease (FAD) in Washington State. A large-scale FAD outbreak has the potential to quickly overwhelm local, county, and state agency resources. For ease, WSDA will use the term FAD as an all-encompassing term for transboundary diseases, emerging infectious diseases, emergency diseases, and the like. In addition to the diseases of concern identified by OIE (World Organisation for Animal Health), multiple diseases remain reportable and require action even though they are not foreign to the United States. For a list of FADs of concern, reportable diseases, and diseases reportable at the state level, see Appendix 11.

This Washington State Foreign Animal Disease Management Plan is being developed by state, industry, and federal agencies to carry out planning, preparation, monitoring, surveillance, response, and recovery to highly infectious FADs, such as Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD), Classical Swine Fever (CSF), African Swine Fever (ASF), Virulent Newcastle Disease (vND), and other diseases as declared by the State Veterinarian.

Low Pathogenic Avian Influenza outbreaks, as well as other Emergency Poultry Diseases that require similar actions, use a different set of plans, and would be managed using the Washington Initial State Response and Containment Plan and the USDA Foreign Animal Disease Preparedness and Response Plans. The Emergency Support Function (ESF) #11, Appendix 2 - State Animal Response Plan, as part of the Washington State Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan (CEMP), provides guidelines for the rapid response to events affecting the health, safety, and welfare of people and animals in the state of Washington.

In Washington State, RCW 38.52 mandates the use of the standardized Incident Command System (ICS) in all multi-agency (federal, state, and local) or multi-jurisdictional incidents and emergencies. WSDA, in participation with local and federal agencies, will use the standardized ICS system for a FAD event.

Introduction

Potential emergencies that livestock producers may face include an outbreak of an emerging infectious disease, serious toxic exposures, and foreign animal diseases (FADs). A rapid response to an animal disease emergency will be necessary to halt the spread of disease and will require interaction between local, state, and federal agencies and industry partners. The WSDA Foreign Animal Disease Response Plan describes the response actions that will be implemented by the WSDA in collaboration with the USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), Veterinary Services (VS), state agencies and entities, local and state emergency management personnel, local and state law enforcement, brand inspectors, and livestock industry partners to swiftly detect, control, and eradicate a disease outbreak on a livestock operation.

Purpose and Scope

The purpose of the Washington State Foreign Animal Disease Response Plan is to provide a framework to ensure a rapid and coordinated response to an outbreak of a highly contagious disease on a livestock operation within the State of Washington. The goal of this plan is three-fold: to control and eradicate the disease on infected premises as quickly as possible; to help affected operations recover; and, to protect and maintain business continuity on unaffected premises during a disease outbreak. This plan provides the operational considerations to minimize the impact of an outbreak affecting an operation and will be applicable to any highly contagious or economically destructive disease or event that causes significant morbidity or mortality in livestock. Natural disasters may also cause devastation in the State’s livestock population requiring a similar response. Many of the protocols and procedures presented in this plan, such as disposal methods, will be applicable in a natural disaster event affecting livestock. In such incidents, the Washington State
Foreign Animal Disease Response Plan may be used as a template to help ensure an adequate response, generally guided by a local jurisdiction.

**Scope of Authority**

As stated in Revised Code of Washington (RCW) 16.36.40, “(1) The director may adopt and enforce rules necessary to carry out the purpose and provisions of this chapter, and including: preventing the introduction or spreading of infections, contagious, communicable, or dangerous diseases affecting animals in this state, WSDA is responsible for regulation related to livestock disease or other livestock emergencies among or affecting livestock in the state. As such, the WSDA will serve as the State’s lead agency during an outbreak of a highly contagious disease affecting livestock in Washington.

Although WSDA serves as the lead agency during an animal disease outbreak in Washington, natural disasters affecting livestock are managed at the local level. County emergency managers can assist producers with developing animal emergency response plans for their premises. When responding to a natural disaster or an outbreak of a highly contagious disease in cattle, local area producers may become a critical response component by providing resource provisions and communicating the threat to area neighbors.

**Situation**

The potential impact on Washington’s economy from a disease outbreak in livestock operations could be devastating. Such an event would be far-reaching, affecting many different sectors including feedlots, processors, distributors, and retailers.

**Assumptions**

- Local, state and federal agencies must work together to send a clear, concise and correct public message concerning the possible effects of the animal disease.
- The Incident Command System will be utilized to respond to all FAD outbreaks in the state of Washington, whether in domestic or wildlife populations.
- If an animal disease emergency occurs in Washington’s livestock operations, the most probable means of discovery will be by producers, private practice veterinarians, and/or trace information from an animal disease investigation in another state. Local livestock experts, such as brand inspectors and livestock extension agents, may be involved in initial local detection and background information about livestock diseases and conditions.
- Private veterinary practitioners will likely be the first responders to any animal disease outbreak.
- Veterinarians are required to immediately notify the State Veterinarian or the USDA APHIS-VS District 10 Washington Office of any suspected FAD.
- An animal disease outbreak may occur through natural pathways or could be introduced as an act of terrorism.
- Diagnosis of a highly contagious or emerging animal disease in Washington, the United States, or surrounding countries may significantly restrict the intrastate, interstate, and international movement of animals (especially livestock) and animal products.
- Initiation and implementation of response actions for a suspected or confirmed positive FAD will be under the jurisdiction of the WSDA and carried out by the State Veterinarian or official designee. Producer input will be highly valued and integrated into the response.
• The State Veterinarian and the USDA-APHIS-VS Washington Office will work in close coordination in any animal health emergency. There are established protocols for investigating and reporting potential FADs and new and emerging infectious animal diseases.

• Response measures for an animal disease emergency may involve the mutual aid support from sister counties and municipalities as well as local private industry support.

• Animal disease emergencies may lead to prolonged economic impact requiring long-term federal and state assistance in response and recovery.

• Psychological counseling and support may need to be available for owners losing livestock or having to depopulate a herd in an animal disease emergency, or for persons responding to the situation.

Plan Maintenance
The Washington State Dept. of Agriculture Rapid Response and Emergency Management Program is responsible for the management and maintenance of this plan, under the jurisdiction of the State Veterinarian and the Director of Agriculture or his designee. The Washington State Foreign Animal Disease Response Plan will be reviewed and updated as required but as often as needed to incorporate updates as well as lessons learned that are identified in the debriefing process and after-action reports following an actual event or training exercise.
Chapter 1: Coordination and Groups

Multi-Agency Coordination Group

With a positive diagnosis of a FAD in the state of Washington, the State Veterinarian will establish a Multi-Agency Coordination Group (MAC-G) to allow input from other local, state, and federal agencies that have the legal responsibility for the protection of animal and human health. This group will coordinate with the Incident Management Teams, as appointed by the State Veterinarian.

Membership of this group may consist of, but is not limited to, representatives of the following agencies:

- Washington State Department of Agriculture (WSDA)
- Washington Department of Fish and Wildlife (WDFW)
- Washington State Department of Health (WDOH)
- U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS)
- U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)
- Washington State University (WSU), Washington Animal Disease Diagnostics Laboratory (WADDL)

Incident Management Teams

The unified command, consisting of the USDA and WSDA, may choose to activate an incident management team (IMT). Priorities for this team will be set forth by the MAC-G. This team will consist initially of WSDA and regional USDA personnel. As the incident expands, additional personnel may be added, along with additional positions to help manage the incident. USDA has multiple national IMTs that may be dispatched as a group to assist and support if requested by the unified commanders. This national team, along with any other set IMT (regional type I, II, or III) will fold into existing response structure and coordinate objectives accordingly. If needed, a regional IMT or USDA IMT may be requested for support. See Appendix 14 for Ag Complexity Analysis Tool.

Joint Information Center

Through unified command, a Joint Information Center (JIC) may be established by WSDA Communications Program to:

- Coordinate public announcements, including agency press releases, alerts, and governor’s proclamations.
- Coordinate with unified command at the Incident Command Post.
- Provide communication directives to other state, local, and federal counterparts.

The JIC will be comprised of public information officers from MAC-G represented agencies, and will be established by the lead agencies within the MAC-G. The establishment of the JIC will be discussed in initial planning meeting with the MAC-G and IMT.
Chapter 2: Response Procedures

If the presence of a FAD is identified in the United States, WSDA will respond in a coordinated, mutually supported manner with local and federal government agencies. The severity of the outbreak will determine response levels. These levels include:

- **Local/limited response.** This level of response is managed by local, state, federal, and industry officials, with response coordination provided primarily at the state and regional levels and with national-level consultation and consequence management.
- **Regional response.** A regional response is managed by local, state, federal, and industry officials, with national-level crisis management, response coordination, consultation, and consequence management.
- **National response.** This level of response requires the combined efforts of local, state, industry, and federal officials, as well as non-agricultural personnel from government (e.g., FEMA) and the private sector in national-level crisis management, response coordination, consultation, and consequence management.

Support for state agencies in a FAD response will be implemented by the Washington State Emergency Management Division (EMD) through State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) activation prior to exceeding agency response capabilities and anticipate depleting their resources.

Regardless of the response level, government officials and the agricultural community must be prepared to work together when dealing with an animal health emergency.

The goals of a FAD response are to (1) detect, control, and contain the disease in animals as quickly as possible; (2) eradicate the disease using strategies that seek to stabilize animal agriculture, the food supply, the economy and protect public health and the environment; and (3) provide science- and risk-based approaches and systems to facilitate continuity of business for non-infected animals and non-contaminated animal products.

Achieving these three goals will allow individual livestock facilities, states, tribal partners, regions, and industries to resume normal production as quickly as possible. The objective is to allow the United States to regain disease-free status without the response effort causing more disruption and damage than the disease outbreak itself.

The response procedures and actions taken by WSDA, USDA, state health officials, livestock stakeholders, and laboratories during a FAD event will be a joint decision between the State Veterinarian and the USDA AVIC or their representative. The response procedures are used to communicate the resource requirements for an event or priority and will be structured using the Incident Command System.

Animal Disease Traceability in Washington

Identifying all premises before a potential outbreak would greatly increase WSDA’s ability to control and mitigate a FAD introduction. States and Tribes may elect to use location identifiers to support their animal disease traceability program. PINs (Premises Identification Numbers) are available through the APHIS PIN allocator, a software application that assigns a unique location identifier/number to a specific geographic location for States and Tribes electing to use it for cattle and swine. The WSDA Animal Disease Traceability Program can assign PINs to producers upon request. That PIN can also be used to order official individual 840 RFID tags that are applied to individual animals for traceability.

The numbering system for the National Scrapie Eradication Program combines a nationally unique flock identification number (FIN) with the producer’s unique livestock production numbering system. This flock-based numbering system for sheep and goats represents an animal group associated with one or more locations. A State or Federal animal health authority assigns the FIN to a group of animals managed as a unit on one or more premises under the same ownership. FINs must be linked to a PIN in the National Scrapie Database.
USDA requires official identification for most animals for interstate movement. However, certain classes of cattle are still exempt (i.e. Beef cattle <18 months of age and all animals moving directly to slaughter). No mandatory identification program for intrastate movement in Washington exists, however, some identification requirements are enforced for certain classes of animals at change of ownership. Animal Disease Traceability will be critical to identify infected or exposed animals to rapidly respond and contain disease.

During any foreign animal disease (FAD) outbreak, WSDA will work collaboratively with USDA to respond. The goals of any FAD response include:

1. Detecting, controlling, and containing the disease as quickly as possible;
2. Eradicating the disease using strategies that seek to stabilize animal agriculture, food supplies, the economy, and to protect public health and the environment; and
3. Providing science- and risk-based approaches and systems to facilitate continuity of business for non-infected animals and non-contaminated products.

Procedures for a FAD Investigation

When suspicious symptoms are observed in livestock, owners and veterinarians are required to notify the State Veterinarian’s office and/or the USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Services (APHIS) Veterinary Services (VS) office in Tumwater, WA pursuant to RCW 16.36.010.

The State Veterinarian and/or USDA AVIC will ensure that a Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostician (FADD) responds within four hours of a report. The FADD will:

- Travel to the site of the suspected FAD;
- Confirm GPS coordinates of the premises;
- Evaluate the situation and obtain a thorough history;
- Establish submission priority for FAD specimens to be sent to NVSL;
- Collect and submit appropriate samples for testing; and
- Report observations to the State Veterinarian and USDA AVIC and provide shipping and submission documents for reporting purposes.

When there is sufficient cause to suspect a FAD, WSDA will issue a hold order to restrict animal movement until preliminary laboratory test results are received pursuant to RCW 16.36.010.

Procedures for a Presumptive Positive of a FAD

When a presumptive positive diagnosis is confirmed by the AHFSL/WADDL facilities, WSDA will:

- Confirm that appropriate samples have been sent to NVSL.
- Contact producer or owner involved.
- Issue a hold order to restrict movement of animals from the suspect premises, if not already issued. A hold order may be replaced with a quarantine order.
- Organize an Initial Planning Meeting with USDA AVIC and WSDA staff: State Veterinarian, Assistant State Veterinarian, Regional WSDA Veterinarian, on farm FADD and WSDA Communications Director.
- Hold a MAC-G meeting to relay test results.

Initial Response Actions and Procedures for a Confirmed Diagnosis of a FAD

When a positive diagnosis of a FAD is confirmed by the NVSL, the USDA Secretary of Agriculture will:
• Issue a National Movement Standstill of at least 72 hours with a detection in livestock or poultry as identified.
• Authorize depopulation of Infected Premises in conjunction with APHIS, Washington State, and tribal animal health officials, using depopulation/euthanasia methods approved by the American Veterinary Medical Association; and
• Authorize payment for virus elimination at a uniform, flat rate, based on the size of the affected premises.

When a positive diagnosis of a FAD is confirmed by the NSVL, the following actions will take place under the direction of the USDA AVIC and WSDA State Veterinarian:

• The MAC-G will convene to set priorities for the disease response. See Appendix 13 for Response Partner Contact Information.
• If needed, a regional IMT or USDA IMT may be requested for support. See Appendix 14 for Ag Complexity Analysis Tool.
• Establish zone and premise quarantine measures. See Chapter 4 and Appendix 1 for additional procedures.
• Set surveillance procedures. See Chapter 5 and Appendix 4.
• Communicate regional and positive premises for biosecurity standards to industry and with appropriate local, state, and federal agencies. See Chapter 6 and Appendix 5.
• Identify a case manager for each positive premises. Case managers are the single communication point for their positive premises.
• Develop premises plan for each positive premises. See Appendix 3.
• Conduct appraisal and depopulation procedures for positive premises per USDA procedures. See Chapter 7 and Appendix 6.
• Determine depopulation and/or controlled marketing procedures. See Chapter 8.
• Coordinate disposal operations with appropriate local, state, and federal agencies. See Chapter 9 and Appendix 7.
• Coordinate cleaning and disinfection procedures. See Chapter 10 and Appendix 8.
• Coordinate recovery and restocking procedures. See Chapter 11.

**National Movement Standstill**

A National Movement Standstill is a complete stop in live livestock movement across the entire United States. It is primarily intended to allow States, Tribes, and industry to gather initial critical information for a unified approach to a FAD response, while inhibiting further disease transmission before effective disease control measures can be successfully implemented.

Controlled movement orders and 24- to 72-hour standstill notices are likely to be implemented upon detection of FAD in the United States in relevant regions or zones. Washington may require statewide movement controls under RCW 16.36.040 and RCW 34.05.350 or at the request of USDA, or in some cases, USDA may impose a Federal quarantine or other movement control by Federal Order when requested by the State Animal Health Official (SAHOs) or as directed by the Secretary of Agriculture.

The duration of a National Movement Standstill may vary depending on the epidemiological circumstances of the outbreak.

Nationwide, the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) uses the following definitions for animal movement controls:

**Standstill Order:** discontinuing all transportation of susceptible animal species *(animals capable of becoming infected with/or biological carriers of the FAD)* on roadways while the Order is in place.
A national (or regional) standstill includes stopping the sending and receiving of all live susceptible animals as well as semen and embryos from susceptible animals. The applicable geographic region may be adjusted based on the location and any known information about introduction and transmission. In general, the following concepts apply:

- All movements of susceptible animals that are in progress when a national/regional movement standstill is announced should continue to move to their intended destinations. Destination premises should accept all movements of susceptible animals that are in progress at the time of the national standstill notice; this should be supported by Washington and other states as well as industry. Reverting animals or returning them to the origin poses serious animal welfare and logistical issues.

- Exceptions may be made for critical movements. APHIS and Washington state officials will determine the characteristics and requirements for these movements (an example would be animals scheduled to move to slaughter within 4 hours of the movement standstill being announced). APHIS and Washington state officials may also approve critical movements of personnel or vehicle movements in a CA or onto and off of an infected premises for delivery of feed or veterinary care, for example.

In the event of a movement standstill, the USDA will provide clear concise policy guidance on the implementation and provisions of, made easily accessible to all stakeholders. Specifications of issuance will at least be defined for:

1. A specific geographical area or boundary (e.g., Nationwide or other);
2. A specific requirement that all susceptible livestock in transit at issuance must reach a destination;
3. A specific time indicating the duration of a standstill (e.g., 72 hours);
4. A specific list of what items are restricted from movement (e.g., live animals and germplasm); and
5. A specific list of what items are exempt from movement restrictions (e.g., negligible risk Food Safety and Inspection Service [FSIS]-inspected products).

If a Federal quarantine or standstill notice is implemented under existing USDA authorities, States may be asked to provide resources to maintain and enforce these requirements; reimbursement formulas for these activities would be established between the States and USDA via cooperative agreement.

The release of this standstill, and costs associated with it, will be weighed carefully by APHIS officials against the risk of further disease transmission from premises that are infected but not yet detected. Additional national-level guidance will be provided when the national/regional movement standstill is lifted. All premises with susceptible animals should continue to implement elevated biosecurity.

Quarantine and movement controls are critical to stopping disease transmission. State, Tribal, and APHIS officials must carefully weigh the risk of disease transmission against the need to critical movements (e.g., feed) and business continuity. A National Movement Standstill only works if all parties involved understand the reasons and goals for a movement standstill, and have planned for it. Policy issued during an incident or outbreak will supersede these general specifications.

Statewide or Regional Emergency Quarantine Rule

If a Foreign Animal Disease (FAD) is diagnosed or suspected in the United States and/or Washington it may become necessary for the Washington State Department of Agriculture (WSDA) to temporarily pause the movement of animals into (interstate) and within (intrastate) the state. This can be accomplished by adopting an emergency rule under RCW 16.36.040 and RCW 34.05.350 designating a statewide or regional quarantine area and establishing criteria for movement controls.

Quarantine and movement controls are critical to stopping disease transmission. In order to gather critical information for a unified approach to a FAD response, Washington state will follow a movement control protocol to inhibit further
disease transmission before effective control measures can be successfully implemented. In Washington, WSDA uses the following definition for animal movement controls:

**Quarantine**: the placing and restraining of any animal or its reproductive products by the owner or agent of the owner within a certain described and designated enclosure or area within this state, or the restraining of any animal or its reproductive products from entering this state, as may be directed in an order by the director. A quarantine can be put in place by either a Quarantine Order or an emergency rule.

- **Emergency quarantine rule (RCW 34.05.350 and RCW 16.36.040)**: An emergency quarantine rule normally takes effect upon filing the appropriate documents with the Office of the Code Reviser. An emergency quarantine rule would designate a statewide or regional area within Washington state as the area under quarantine. It may also specify import restrictions on animals or animal reproductive products from other states. The documents would include a justification for utilizing the emergency rulemaking process and also rule language specifying the parameters of the quarantine. Parameters may include: species of quarantine animals, quarantine area(s), restriction details, any permitting allowances, etc. Emergency rules are in effect for 120 days and can only be extended under certain circumstances. Modifications can be made to an emergency rule by filing another emergency rule. In order to lift the quarantine, WSDA will have to file an emergency rule repeal. The emergency quarantine will automatically end after the 120-day time period.

- **Quarantine Order**: A Quarantine Order is a form issued by the State Veterinarians Office. A Quarantine Order would be issued to a specific premises. The Quarantine Order shall remain in effect as long as the director deems necessary.

The adoption of an emergency rule for a statewide or regional quarantine will depend on the epidemiology of a FAD outbreak in the U.S. and the proximity to Washington. When necessary, an emergency rule for a statewide or regional quarantine and individual quarantine or hold orders will allow WSDA and USDA to complete any necessary epidemiological and traceback investigations to determine if the FAD has entered Washington.

All movements of susceptible animals that are in progress when an emergency quarantine rule is adopted should continue to move to their intended destinations. Destination premises should accept all movements of susceptible animals that are in progress at the time of the emergency quarantine rule adoption; this should be supported by Washington and other states as well as industry. Reverting animals or returning them to the point of origin poses serious animal welfare and logistical issues.

After the emergency quarantine rule goes into effect, a grace period of 24 hours will be allowed for animals already in transit to complete that movement by either returning to their point of origin or continuing to their destination. After this period of time and once the investigation is complete, low-risk movements may be restored for facilities and producers not infected or epidemiologically linked to the point source. This could be done by a permit if the emergency rule contains language regarding permit exceptions or modification of the emergency rule. Infected premises and other premises within the emergency quarantine area (including the determined response plan Control Area) that have been issued a Quarantine Order will be subject to a different timeline for release than the one outlined in this document and may require a permitting process as described in Chapter 4: Quarantine and Permitted Movement.

Any susceptible species not already in transit during the 24-hour grace period may be instructed to house in-place until otherwise determined by WSDA. This process functions under the assumption that both individual producers and production systems have Continuity of Operations and/or Continuity of Business plans including pre-established protocols to address interruptions to normal production timelines.

Washington state general standstill protocols include:

- **Scope of Authority**
- **Assumptions and Timeframes**
• Classification of a FAD outbreak
• Role of Response Partners
• Role of peace officers in Washington
• Penalties for violating the Emergency Quarantine Rule, Quarantine Order or Hold Order
• Internal and external communications
• Methods to resume movement

For complete information on the protocol for a statewide or regional emergency quarantine rule, see Appendix 1.
Vaccine Use

NOTE: The Washington FMD Vaccination Plan is currently under development between WSDA, USDA, DOH and Washington State University.

Vaccination for a FAD can be used in a number of different circumstances. In most cases, use of a FAD vaccine will have potential international trade implications. Thus, access and permission to use vaccines will be controlled by USDA APHIS. Vaccine use could be sought by WSDA under a number of scenarios:

- A highly infectious FAD is discovered in Washington that cannot be contained by quarantine and euthanasia of infected and exposed animals alone. In this case, Ring Vaccination could be used to vaccinate susceptible, but not yet exposed, animals. These resistant animals would form a barrier, slowing the progression of the FAD. Vaccinated animals would be slaughtered after the outbreak is contained using normal slaughter channels.
- A highly infectious FAD is discovered in Washington, and facilities containing large numbers of susceptible animals are within the quarantine area (i.e. feedlots, dry lot dairies, swine confinement facilities, etc.). Vaccines, and anti-virals when available, could be utilized to protect these facilities from infection. The vaccinated animals would be slaughtered after the outbreak is contained using normal slaughter channels.

By preventing infection of these facilities, problems associated with euthanasia of large numbers of animals are avoided and meat is preserved for human consumption.

For more information on vaccine application, see Appendix 2.

National Veterinary Stockpile Plan

The National Veterinary Stockpile (NVS) program, within the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Veterinary Services, Surveillance, Preparedness and Response Services Logistics Center, holds or has access to veterinary supplies, equipment, animal vaccines, and human antiviral medications ready to deploy within 24 hours. The program also maintains contracts with all-hazards response companies, which can quickly provide large numbers of trained personnel and equipment to assist a State when it does not have enough of its own personnel and equipment to depopulate, dispose, and decontaminate. The NVS Program provides States with the resources and countermeasures they need to respond to a damaging animal disease outbreak.

WSDA maintains the Washington State NVS Plan to ensure resources can be acquired, received, stored, staged, and distributed for a large outbreak response after local supplies have been exhausted.

For more information, visit the NVS program webpage.
Chapter 3: Diagnostic Resources

The Washington State University (WSU) Washington Animal Disease Diagnostics Laboratory (WADDL) in Pullman, and their Avian Health and Food Safety Laboratory (AHFSL) in Puyallup, both perform routine and initial diagnostic testing for Washington livestock. Both the WSU AHFSL and the WADDL are part of the National Animal Health Laboratory Network (NAHLN) laboratory system, and are authorized to conduct FAD tests. They also have executed a memorandum of understanding with the WSDA, and comply with testing and record-keeping requirements.

Samples associated with an animal mortality event or other sampling conducted in response to clinical signs in livestock suggestive of a FAD, are managed as FAD investigations. Samples will be collected in duplicate, and one set will be submitted to the National Veterinary Services Laboratory (NVSL) as a Priority 1 investigation (see prioritization definitions below). The second sample set will be sent to AHFSL/WADDL to provide preliminary FAD diagnostic information. The results of the testing will be reported immediately to the State Veterinarian and USDA Veterinary Services Area Veterinarian in Charge. Any FAD positive samples from Washington livestock submitted to AHFSL/WADDL for FAD surveillance will also be forwarded to NVSL for confirmatory testing.

Prior to arriving at the NVSL, submissions will be categorized for priority of processing. NVSL must be contacted by phone prior to shipment or transport of all diagnostic samples regardless of Priority 1, 2, 3, or A diagnostic sample designation.

WADDL laboratories will report all official tests on official USDA/APHIS or equivalent forms to the WSDA and the USDA AVIC. Any diagnoses of a FAD shall not be publicly reported. The WSDA shall establish detailed reporting procedures after consultation with appropriate entities, which shall include representatives of the affected livestock industry or industries.

Priority 1
This priority is used when prompt laboratory diagnostic information is required because known investigation information makes it highly likely that the observed condition is a foreign animal disease / emerging disease incident (FAD/EDI). Specimens will be unpacked and examined, and diagnostic assays will begin immediately upon arrival at the NVSL. Results will be reported by telephone, fax, and/or computer, according to program procedures, immediately as results are obtained (including progress reports) and upon completion of laboratory examination (final report). Contact the NVSL (regardless of destination laboratory) prior to shipping a Priority 1 submission.

Priority 2
This priority is used when known investigation information indicates it is possible that the observed condition is a FAD/EDI, but it cannot be distinguished from an endemic disease/condition. Therefore, rapid laboratory diagnostic information is necessary. Specimens will be processed the day they are received if the samples reach the laboratory before the close of the workday. Specimens arriving after the close of the work day will be examined the following day, including weekends. Results will be reported by telephone, fax, and/or computer as they are obtained (progress) and when examination is completed (final). Contact NVSL, using the phone numbers, prior to shipping a Priority 2 submission to NVSL.

Priority 3
This priority is used when known investigation information indicates it is unlikely that the observed condition is a FAD/EDI and cannot be distinguished from an enzootic disease or condition. Specimens will be processed according to accession number order, unless otherwise directed by the NVSL Case Coordinator or Laboratory Director. A specimen arriving after 4:00 p.m. on Friday will not be processed until Monday or later, depending on the current backlog of cases. Contact NVSL, using the phone numbers shown above, prior to shipping a Priority 3 submission to NVSL.
Priority A

This priority is used for those situations where any animals in commerce are held pending the results of testing for a FAD/EDI. It can also be used when other known or potential circumstances surrounding the investigation indicate that it would be prudent to obtain laboratory test results as rapidly as possible, regardless of the likelihood of the presence of a FAD/EDI. Priority A samples are processed in the same manner as Priority 1 samples.

Contact the NVSL (regardless of destination) prior to shipping a Priority A submission. Use the phone numbers shown above.
Chapter 4: Holds, Quarantines and Permitted Movement

WSDA has the authority to take actions necessary to halt the spread of a FAD and to eradicate the disease. Controls may be put into place to restrict movement of animals, livestock handling equipment, and other vectors, such as vehicles, that are associated with livestock and could spread the disease. All events such as exhibitions, shows, and sales could be suspended.

To help stop the spread of disease pathogens, some animals and animal products will have to be traced and/or recalled, and the movements of people, equipment, and non-susceptible animals will have to be controlled. The governor must authorize any prohibition of human movement from the affected zone.

Hold Order
The Washington state Animal Health law, RCW 16.36.010, makes a provision for issuing a hold order on a suspected or unknown premises. WSDA can issue a hold order when:

- Overt disease or exposure to disease in an animal is not immediately obvious, but there is reasonable cause to investigate whether an animal is diseased or has been exposed to disease;
- Import health papers, permits, or other transportation documents required by law or rule are not complete or are suspected to be fraudulent; or
- Further transport of an animal would jeopardize the wellbeing of the animal or other animals in Washington State.

A hold order expires at midnight on the 14th day from the date it was issued. Because it automatically expires, a Hold Order does not have to be officially released by the Office of the Washington State Veterinarian. If necessary, a hold order can be renewed or replaced with another hold order or a quarantine order. See Appendix 1 for procedures for placing a hold order.

Quarantine
The WSDA Director may issue an alert of emergency border restrictions when there is a confirmed diagnosis of a FAD in the livestock and poultry industries in another state. This may include restricted movement of livestock, poultry, animal transport vehicles, and products as appropriate for the particular disease. If a quarantine zone is required, WSDA will do so by Emergency Rule in accordance with RCW 34.05 and under the authority given in RCW 16.36.040.

Premises Quarantine
The Director or State Veterinarian may issue a quarantine order and enforce the quarantine of any animal or its reproductive products when:

- Any animal or its reproductive products are affected with or have been exposed to disease;
- Or when there is reasonable cause to investigate whether any animal or its reproductive products are affected with or have been exposed to disease, either within or outside the state.

Authority for control and movement restriction of people from infected premises resides under the jurisdiction of the Washington State Department of Health under the Washington Administrative Code (WAC) 246-100-040 - Procedures for isolation or quarantine. See Appendix 1 for procedures for isolation and quarantine of livestock.

Quarantine Zone
WSDA will implement a quarantine zone by Emergency Rule in accordance with chapter 34.05 RCW and under the authority of RCW 16.36.040. Quarantine zones shall be established in accordance with USDA FADPreP guidelines.
Overt disease or exposure to disease in any animal or its reproductive products need not be immediately obvious for a quarantine order to be issued or enforced. Any animal or animal reproductive product placed under quarantine may not be moved, transported, or sold without written approval from the director or until the quarantine is released. The quarantine shall remain in effect as long as the director deems necessary.

The director or State Veterinarian may issue a quarantine order and enforce the quarantine of any animal or its reproductive products when any animal or its reproductive products are affected with or have been exposed to disease or when there is reasonable cause to investigate whether any animal or its reproductive products are affected with or have been exposed to disease, either within or outside the state. The quarantine shall remain in effect as long as the director deems necessary.

The director may issue a hold order when overt disease or exposure to disease in an animal is not immediately obvious but there is reasonable cause to investigate whether an animal is diseased or has been exposed to disease or import health papers, permits, or other transportation documents required by law or rule are not complete or are suspected to be fraudulent or further transport of an animal would jeopardize the well-being of the animal or other animals in Washington state.

Quarantine Release
Following the completion of cleaning and disinfection of the last infected premises in a quarantine zone, quarantine release will be determined by the AVIC and the State Veterinarian and agreed upon by the producer. When the designated timeline is met, restrictions can be removed and repopulation of non-restricted farms may begin. Surveillance zone and infected zone quarantines will be officially released. Premises quarantines may be lifted three weeks after the cleaning and disinfecting of all affected facilities/premises if enhanced surveillance is being conducted in the quarantine zone.

When depopulation and vaccination are used, the lifting of quarantines will be related to the date when all sentinel animals are serologically negative on two consecutive tests that are conducted at least 14 days apart.

Embargo Actions
Vector/contamination control may require discarding large quantities of agricultural products and organic matter, invoking embargoes or trade restrictions, culling livestock or poultry, and identifying alternate sources of food. Embargo actions may be put in place when food products need to be restricted within a quarantine zone.

Permitted/Controlled Movement
Washington relies on the National Secure Food Supply Plans for specific biosecurity, surveillance, and movement requirements for products moving to market from negative premises within a quarantine zone. See Appendix 1 for routine movement restrictions including premises restrictions and tracing movement.

Permit System
Regulatory personnel will establish a permit system to manage all movements to and from infected premises, contact premises, and suspect premises. See Appendix 3.
Chapter 5: Surveillance

Statutory authority for animal health surveillance is provided to WSDA in chapter 16.36 of the RCW. Under RCW 16.36.010, the director of Agriculture is entrusted with the responsibility to prevent the spread of disease within Washington State.

RCW 43.23.070, the Powers and Duties of the State Veterinarian, provides that within the general authority has the ability to conduct testing and diagnostic procedures, limit animal movement, and control and eradicate foreign and emergency diseases.

Non-animal origin food products may be embargoed to control the transmission of highly infectious agents of animal diseases on non-traditional products.

Authority exists to restrict or control the movement of people from infected premises under the jurisdiction of the Washington State Department of Health via the following statutes:

- WAC 246-100-040 Procedures for isolation or quarantine
- WAC 246-100-045 Conditions and principles for isolation or quarantine
- WAC 246-100-050 Isolation or quarantine premises

Monitoring and Surveillance in Quarantine Zones

WSDA and/or USDA will begin surveillance and monitoring of the affected premises, the Control Area, the original surveillance zone, and the general area for a period of time as established by the State Veterinarian and USDA AVIC. Initial surveillance and monitoring will consist of a FADD investigation of any reported suspicious signs in animals. Upon laboratory diagnosis of a FAD, enhanced surveillance will begin on all commercial and noncommercial livestock operations within the quarantine zone.

All premises implicated from the epidemiological study/trace back of infected premises will be subject to a follow up inspection, whether or not they are in the quarantine zone. The results of the epidemiological investigation will determine the dangerous contact premises, and all dangerous contact premises will be quarantined.

Active Surveillance

On-Farm Sampling
Task force personnel will establish on-farm sampling protocols for testing premises in quarantine zones.

Passive Surveillance

Sick Calls
WSDA will establish an information-sharing center via telephone, through an internet link to access an online form, or by contacting animal health personnel reporting or providing service to sick animals.

Epidemiological Investigation

All premises implicated from the epidemiological study of infected premises will be subject to a follow up inspection, whether or not they are in the quarantine zone. The results of the epidemiological investigation will determine the contact premises. All contact premises will be quarantined.

Livestock producers will be provided with self-quarantine guidelines, asked to complete site specific plans, and may be asked to complete compliance agreements. Self-quarantine guidelines provide producers direction on protecting their livestock from infection and documents their herd’s continued disease free status. Self-quarantined livestock will be
subject to testing as determined by the State Veterinarian. WSDA responders will request sampling of sick and dead animals of livestock operations.

Serological testing should take place with increased frequency within the quarantine zone. Specific surveillance testing instructions for each production type as well as provisions for monitoring control zone activities, including detailed instructions on how to conduct testing in each control zone, are located in Appendix 4.
Chapter 6: Biosecurity

An outbreak of a highly contagious foreign animal disease can have a serious impact on the agriculture industry. Personnel in contact with animal enterprises should routinely implement strict biosecurity measures to prevent or slow the spread of the disease. All personnel will adhere to biosecurity standards as established by the State Veterinarian. Proper biosecurity standards will be established and outlined in Appendix 5.

Biosecurity measures are aimed at:

- Keeping disease agents out of populations in which the pathogens do not already exist; and
- Preventing the spread of disease agents already present in livestock populations to other uninfected susceptible or non-susceptible groups within or outside the populations. A pig that shares a backyard premises with a group of chickens is an example of a susceptible group within a population.

A basic biosecurity plan includes:

- Implementing cleaning and disinfecting (C&D) procedures to reduce or eliminate pathogens and pathogen transmission.
- Use of PPE
- Controlling the movement of people, animals, vehicles, and equipment.
- Keeping accurate records on animals, including animal identification, vaccination, health records, pedigree, and production.
- Isolating newly purchased or returning animals for a suitable period of time (e.g. 30 days) before introducing or reintroducing them into a herd or flock.
- Protecting animals from rodents and other forms of vermin, insects, and wildlife that can spread disease agents.
- Employee training plan.

Common Sources of Biosecurity Risk

WSDA personnel should identify areas of biosecurity risk in order to prevent the introduction of pathogens onto a premises. Common areas of concern include:

- **People, animals, vehicles, and equipment.** Strict biosecurity measures for people, animals, vehicles, and equipment must be observed at all times. Measures might include, locking unguarded entrances, and patrolling and repairing boundary fences. WSDA Animal Services Compliance officers may be involved in verifying fences and barriers are intact and compliant.

- **Contaminated feed and water.** Feed should be purchased only from suppliers with a quality assurance program in place for the safe manufacturing, storage, and delivery of their products. Special care should be taken to prevent feed and water from coming into contact with animal waste or other potentially contaminated animal products.

- **Contact with other animals.** Exposure to pathogens can occur at livestock shows, in hospital pens, at livestock markets, wildlife contact, and during the introduction or reintroduction of animals into a herd. Owners should isolate new animals, as well as any animals that may have traveled off the premises, before introducing or reintroducing them into the herd.

Mitigating Biosecurity Risk

Biosecurity risks can be mitigated with appropriate actions that include:

- Quarantine and isolation of animals being introduced into a herd or flock (e.g. 30 days).
• Instituting appropriate hygienic precautions for people having contact with animals, animal products, and animal secretions and excretions.
• Accurate record keeping regarding animal history.
• Accounting for the history of potentially contaminated equipment, animal transport vehicles, and other vehicles that could infect the premises.
• Cleaning and disinfecting premises, vehicles, equipment, and materials.
• Cleaning and disinfecting or disposing of contaminated materials.
• Designating feed equipment to be used only for handling feed.
• Inspecting susceptible livestock regularly for signs of disease.
• Making an effort to avoid moving animals.
• Log in all visitors and require them to sign in and sign out.
• Ensuring that visitors follow biosecurity procedures.
• Minimizing visitor contact with susceptible animals.
• Ensuring that if travel between premises is necessary, each site is treated as a separate bio-secure area and implement C&D procedures for personal hygiene, clothing, footwear, vehicles, and equipment.

Housed Animals
Under most circumstances, housed susceptible animals are at reduced disease risk and should remain housed if possible. Housed animals should not be mingled with animals of unknown disease status. Additionally, animals should not be moved into barns or other facilities that have housed infected or potentially infected animals unless these buildings have first been thoroughly cleaned and disinfected.

Animals Penned Outside
If susceptible animals are penned outside at all times, or if they must be turned out from a housed environment, reduce the risk of pathogen transmission by:
  • Keeping groups of animals separated by a distance sufficient to prevent pathogen transmission (e.g., at least one empty field away from other animals)
  • Preventing close or direct contact between groups of animals.
  • Consulting with neighbors about the use of boundary or adjoining fields as barriers
  • Checking that all fences are secure.
  • Keeping animals off pastures grazed by infected or potentially infected animals.

Responder Training
WSDA will train responders in the areas of biosecurity, animal health, humane animal care, sample collection, chain of custody, personal protective equipment, and emergency response to facilitate an effective, integrated response.
Chapter 7: Appraisal and Compensation

Appraisal

The depopulation of animals may be ordered to prevent the spread of a FAD or emerging disease incident. All efforts will be made to achieve the maximum indemnification for a producer’s loss. With federal qualifying events, the federal appraisal and indemnification process outlined in U.S. Code of Federal Regulations 9CFR53.3 is the most efficient appraisal process for livestock and poultry producers (note: additional requirements for indemnity for HPAI (H5, H7) are outlined in 9CFR Part 5). Under this federal code, a percentage of fair market value will be paid to the owners for livestock that must be depopulated or materials that must be destroyed to prevent the spread of an animal disease.

Under RCW 16.36.096, WSDA may pay an indemnity in an amount not to exceed seventy-five percent of the appraised or salvage value of the animal ordered slaughtered or destroyed. In the event of an Emergency Proclamation by the Governor, additional funds for indemnifications and appraisals may be available through federal assistance.

Information on procedures to implement appraisal activities is contained in Appendix 5 and Appendix 6.

Indemnification

In ordering the slaughter or destruction of any animal, the director may pay an indemnity in an amount not to exceed seventy-five percent of the appraised or salvage value of the animal ordered slaughtered or destroyed. The actual indemnity amount shall be established by the director by rule. Payment of indemnity does not apply to an animal that:

- Belongs to the federal government or any of its agencies;
- Belongs to the state of Washington or any of its agencies;
- Belongs to any municipal corporation; or
- Has been brought into this state in violation of chapter 16.36 RCW or rules adopted under that chapter.

For both processes, the owner and state or federal officials must mutually agree on the value of the animals prior to depopulation. Under certain situations, this may require a physical appraisal of livestock and/or poultry. In previous highly infectious disease outbreaks, the USDA paid for the cost of euthanasia, carcass disposal, and decontamination. Washington will follow USDA procedures to request assistance with indemnification of producers in response to an eligible disease incident.
Chapter 8: Depopulation and Euthanasia

Euthanasia/depopulation helps prevent or mitigate the spread of disease through the elimination of infected or contact animals in order to mitigate the spread of disease. Euthanasia/depopulation will be outlined in the site plan developed for each infected premises. Until euthanasia/depopulation procedures are initiated, the responsible party will ensure that livestock are provided with food, water, and appropriate environmental conditions.

WSDA recognizes a difference between euthanasia and depopulation. Euthanasia involves transitioning an animal to death as painlessly and stress-free as possible. Mass depopulation is a method by which large numbers of animals must be destroyed quickly and efficiently with as much consideration given to the welfare of the animals as practicable. However, for the purposes of this document, the terms “mass depopulation” and “euthanasia” may be used interchangeably or simply be referred to as “euthanasia,” regardless of whether they are actually considered euthanasia or depopulation.

For each euthanasia situation, criteria for selecting the optimal method should include:

- Risk of spreading the disease agent.
- The number, location, size, weight, behavioral characteristics of the species to be euthanized.
- The extent to which the method induces loss of consciousness and death in the animal quickly and with minimal pain, distress, anxiety, or apprehension.
- The environment where the livestock are maintained (e.g., barn, backyard).
- Availability of facilities.
- The need for specialized equipment (e.g., CO2 chamber, chemicals, foam).
- Public acceptance of the euthanasia method.
- Hazard to the environment
- The emotional effect of the method on personnel, owners, and observers.
- The availability of sufficient trained, and experienced personnel to implement a given method.
- Personnel safety during the implementation of euthanasia.

The stated goal of depopulation is to depopulate infected premises within 24 hours after confirmation of positive status. Depending on circumstances, other options may need to be considered. Additional information on procedures to implement depopulation activities are contained in Appendix 6 of this plan. As new methods of euthanasia or mass depopulation are discovered or approved by AVMA, they will be considered and implemented on a case by case basis after appropriate training and familiarization.

Selecting a Method of Euthanasia

The method selected for euthanasia must be appropriate to the species involved. To ensure selection of the optimal and most humane euthanasia method for a given species, veterinarians with species-specific expertise and experience should be consulted during the planning process. Euthanasia procedures will follow the American Veterinary Medical Association’s Guidelines on Euthanasia. Personnel responsible for directing euthanasia operations should have a working knowledge of the methods selected.

Another important element of humane euthanasia concerns the expertise of the individuals performing the procedure. The role of proper personnel training in minimizing animal pain and stress during euthanasia cannot be overemphasized. Personnel who are assigned euthanasia duties must have appropriate training and experience with the animal species to be euthanized, and with the euthanasia method to be used. Refer to Appendix 6 for considerations when selecting the method of euthanasia.
Animal Handling and Restraint
Proper animal handling and restraint are vital to the success of the euthanasia operation. In all cases, the animals should be handled as calmly, quietly, and gently as possible.

- Proper handling is important in minimizing animal pain and distress.
- Proper handling ensures the safety of euthanasia crews and protects other people and animals in the area.
- Some methods of euthanasia require that animals be physically restrained. Ensure that an adequate number of personnel are available before moving the animal from its housing.
- Animals that cannot be handled safely should be euthanized in their customary housing. The carcass should then be removed immediately so rigor mortis does not impede handling.

Public Protection
Euthanasia should be performed in such a way and in such a location as to ensure public safety and to protect the public from viewing euthanasia activities.

Site Selection
Consider the following criteria when selecting a euthanasia site:

- Protection of bystanders and uninfected animals. If feasible, animals to be euthanized should be moved away from bystanders and neighbors, from the view of the public, and from uninfected animals and wildlife. Pets and other animals not designated for euthanasia should be confined well away from the euthanasia site. Live animals infected with a highly contagious disease should not be transported past premises with susceptible species.
- Avoidance of the risk of harm to property from the euthanasia method. If gunshot is used, for example, the euthanasia site should be located in such a way as to protect premises buildings, people, and other livestock from stray bullets or ricochet.
- Availability of facilities and equipment, including methods of animal restraint. Consider the animal’s species, breed, degree of domestication, temperament, behavioral characteristics, size, weight, and degree of excitement as well as the presence of disease or pain when determining the methods of restraint.

Sequence of Euthanasia Activities
In general, animals should be euthanized in the following order:

- Animals with the greatest propensity to shed the disease agent (e.g., infected swine are reported to produce 100 to 1000 times greater concentration of FMD virus in aerosols than do cattle).
- Animals showing clinical signs of disease.
- Animals that have had contact with diseased animals.
- Animals susceptible to the disease of concern.
- Animals euthanized for humane reasons.

Information on procedures to implement depopulation activities is contained in Appendix 6.

Public Considerations
A major disease outbreak and response in this country can be expected to attract considerable media attention and interest, especially in the early stages of the incident. It is important that animal emergency response personnel work to gain the support of the public. The media may be helpful in raising public awareness of the necessity of the euthanasia activities for disease eradication and the humaneness of the procedures used. Media may also document the presence
of animal care experts and representatives of animal welfare subject matter experts invited to observe the euthanasia activities, thereby reassuring the public that the most humane methods are used.

**The Euthanasia Team**

The work of the euthanasia team on infected or contact premises is essential to the containment and control of a disease outbreak. The euthanasia team consists of individuals who are skilled and experienced in humane euthanasia procedures, and who will work with veterinarians and animal health technicians to ensure animals are euthanized humanely.

Before any euthanasia work is initiated, team members should be briefed fully about the nature of the disease with which they are dealing and on the hazards associated with the euthanasia methods to be used. The case manager will inform the owner, the owner’s family, and premises employees on euthanasia-related hazards.

Specific safety precautions and hygiene requirements must be explained before the euthanasia team enters the premises. The team and participating livestock managers and assisting personnel must be supplied with all necessary personal protective equipment and safety equipment. A safety officer should be assigned to each euthanasia team to assess safety hazards and monitor responder compliance throughout the process.

The safety of the euthanasia team may be affected by several factors, including:

- The size and body weight of the animals to be euthanized.
- The temperament of the species being euthanized. The team will be able to implement euthanasia measures more safely, quickly, and humanely if they understand the animals’ temperament and are experienced in handling the species.
- The animals’ familiarity with humans. Special care and precautions should be taken if the animals are unaccustomed to being handled by humans.
- Animals generally regarded as dangerous (e.g., bison, bulls, sows with litters, large boars, tusked boars, and all of the cervid species).
- Methods and equipment available for animal restraint. Restraining methods and equipment used must be sufficient to ensure the safety of team members.

In a major disease outbreak, large numbers of animals will be producing and transmitting pathogens to other animals. Thus, the more quickly large-scale euthanasia activities can be completed, the more quickly pathogen transmission can be brought under control.

**Minimizing Personnel Stress**

Although animal euthanasia is commonly a necessary step in disease eradication, extinguishing animal life is a difficult and often stressful process. The euthanasia team should assess the experience and skills of personnel and ensure that each individual has the information and skills needed to implement euthanasia activities quickly, humanely, and effectively.

Ideally, only experienced personnel will be involved with euthanasia activities. However, even experienced personnel can find these procedures stressful. The team manager should observe personnel for signs of undue stress and be prepared to suggest a break, a shift of duties, talk with a counselor, or other appropriate action. At the very least, team members should be encouraged to take frequent breaks, have regular meals, and get adequate sleep.

Some individuals will have continued difficulty with the stress of working in on a euthanasia team. These team members should be shifted to less stressful roles in the disease eradication effort. Critical incident stress debriefing should be required for all personnel involved with mass euthanasia activities.
Minimizing Owner Stress

It is recommended that the owner and the owner’s family not be present on the premises while euthanasia activities are taking place, especially if the family includes young children and/or if family members have emotional bonds with the animals concerned. As a matter of human compassion and consideration, the owner and family should be given a complete explanation of what to expect. If the owner and family choose to stay on the premises while euthanasia activities are implemented, they may experience considerable stress. Community mental health facilities and religious institutions may be helpful in providing educational, counseling, and referral services.

The euthanasia team leader should meet with the owner prior to the initiation of euthanasia activities to:

- Explain the euthanasia method chosen and why it was selected.
- Suggest that the owner and family leave the premises while euthanasia activities are proceeding.
- Identify safety considerations, including the need to confine domestic pets and uninfected animals away from the site.
- Provide educational and referral services for coping with stress as needed.
Chapter 9: Disposal

Disposal methods should effectively stop the spread of the disease while having a minimal impact on the environment. During a large scale animal health emergency, it is likely that more than one disposal method will be utilized and competent professionals registered in Washington will assist in decision making. Discussions to utilize any of the available options for disposal will be based on agreement between the state departments of Ecology, Health, Fish and Wildlife, county and local health and solid waste officials, and USDA APHIS. Prior planning at the local, state, and national levels to identify suitable options for various sites and species must be done to attain an effective disposal plan.

The following options will be implemented in accordance with all local ordinances and state and federal laws, and as prescribed in the USDA FAD PReP National Animal Health Emergency Management System Guidelines: Disposal and guidelines provided by the Department of Ecology and the Department of Health.

Current disposal options for handling carcasses, manure, and other related contaminated items are:

- Composting on site (preferred)
- Rendering
- Permitted Landfill/ Burial
- Fixed-Facility Incineration
- Air Curtain Incineration
- Anaerobic Digestion

Carcasses and materials contaminated with transmissible spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) agents should be disposed of using an alkaline hydrolysis tissue digester, or if that is not an option, incineration over 1000°F.

Disposal Considerations

- Disease control
- Local/public concerns and regulations
- Worker health and safety
- Biosecurity
- Disinfection
- Cost
- Need for subject matter expertise
- Available carbon sources for composting
- Special equipment
  - Availability of equipment for moving carcasses
  - Local health and environmental concerns (e.g. water tables and streams)

During a disease outbreak, there is a very high likelihood of generating massive amounts of contaminated biomass which can have a severe impact on public health. Biomass may include contaminated feed, grain, hay, litter, and manure. If composting is being used as a disposal method for animal mortality, these materials may be included in the compost windrows.

Additional information on procedures for disposal can be found in Appendix 7.
Chapter 10: Cleaning and Disinfecting

Cleaning and disinfection (C&D) procedures are a crucial part of a FAD response. The potential for spread or transfer of microorganisms can occur from the direct or indirect contamination of a premises, equipment, vehicles, personnel, and the movement of animals or animal products. Highly contagious diseases may spread through the movement of infected animals, animal products, or fomites (feces, bedding, vehicles, harness, etc.) and convey disease agents to susceptible animals.

Where a contagious disease is involved, vehicles, holding pens, equipment, and various facilities must be cleaned and disinfected. With highly contagious diseases, the C&D procedures extend to the entire premises. Personnel involved with C&D functions must be knowledgeable about general C&D principles, methods, and procedures.

Cleaning and disinfecting (C&D) infected or dangerous contact premises will be the primary responsibility of the owner.

- The owner may be compensated for certain expenses at a rate established prior to C&D activities.
- State or federal personnel will monitor the progress of C&D activities and will conduct inspections of each phase to ensure compliance with this protocol.
- WSDA or USDA authorized personnel must document the successful completion of C&D.

WSDA or USDA personnel duties include:

- Ensure that C&D protocols are included in facility site plan.
- Determine and assign adequate personnel to accomplish C&D.
- Review C&D protocol with facility management and establish timelines.
- Ensure vector and pest control programs are in place.
- Ensuring movement of manure and other miscellaneous contaminated items are in accordance with written disposal plan.

It is important that any physical or chemical processes used to C&D an infected premises reduce, remove, inactivate or destroy pathogenic microorganisms. C&D process should be consistent with current scientific knowledge for virus destruction.

Procedures for cleaning and disinfecting both commercial and non-commercial premises are outlined in Appendix 8 of this plan.
Chapter 11: Recovery and Repopulation

Repopulation is a process of restocking premises after they have been depopulated, cleaned and disinfected, surveillance has determined the absence of a disease agent, and the premises and area have been released from zone quarantines. Specific procedures for repopulation will vary depending on the type of operation and USDA AVIC recommendations and approval.

Restocking
Following appropriate cleaning and disinfection procedures, infected premises will remain vacant for a period of time (fallow period) before restocking susceptible animals onto premises. The fallow period should be a minimum of two disease incubation periods or other appropriate time period determined by the State Veterinarian.

The producer should develop a restocking plan, including details of the susceptible species, number of animals, and locations of sentinel animals (if used). Once introduced to the previously infected premises, no animals may leave until all locations on that premises have been restocked and serological diagnostics are negative.

Producers must have written consent from the State Veterinarian and USDA APHIS VS official to begin the restocking process. If producers choose to restock without explicit permission from the State Veterinarian or USDA APHIS VS officials, do not follow the restocking surveillance and testing requirements, and subsequently become re-infected, they may not be eligible to receive indemnity.

Quarantine Releases
After completion of C&D of the last infected premises in a quarantine zone, restrictions can be removed and repopulation of non-restricted farms may begin as soon as determined by the State Veterinarian and/or USDA APHIS VS officials. Surveillance zone and affected zone quarantines will be officially released.

If the initial quarantine generated a news release or other announcement, a supplemental announcement should be considered to advise that the quarantine has been lifted.

Surveillance and Monitoring
Surveillance and monitoring of the area and all previously restricted premises, especially those within the original surveillance and affected zones, will continue for a period of five months or as determined by the State Veterinarian and/or USDA APHIS VS officials.

FADD Investigation
A Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostician will investigate any susceptible animals on the restocked premises with suspicious signs for a period of time equal to three incubation periods for the disease or other appropriate time period as determined by the State Veterinarian and/or USDA APHIS VS officials.
Chapter 12: Public Awareness and Education

Under the ICS, a Joint Information Center (JIC) will be established as a central or virtual location, depending on needs, for all public information dissemination, public affair functions, and crisis communications. Under most circumstances, the Unified Command will appoint a public information officer (PIO) to act as the lead for a FAD disease outbreak. This PIO will coordinate the JIC with the MAC-G and other applicable stakeholders.

The JIC handles on-scene media and public inquiries, emergency public information and warnings, rumor and media monitoring, website updates and social media. The JIC will coordinate, clear with appropriate authorities, and disseminate accurate and timely information related to the incident. Information released to the public should be timely and include at least the following general information:

- The nature and extent of the emergency;
- Impacted or potentially affected areas of the state;
- Human health implications or lack thereof; and
- Activities carried out by government officials and industry leaders to respond to the outbreak and mitigate its effects.

WSDA will hold informational meetings, training sessions, and awareness campaigns with outside experts, government scientists, media, and industry early in the outbreak to educate the public and stakeholders. The educational campaigns may include:

- Emphasis on biosecurity
- Educational and instructional materials, available in multiple languages and customized to target audiences and taking into consideration audiences with functional needs
- State and federal web sites for additional information and guidance
- Providing information to avian exhibitions and meetings
- Worker educational materials for industry on methods of disease transmission and biosecurity
- Specific outreach to small producers

Industry Meeting

After official notification of a positive diagnosis of a FAD, WSDA will hold industry meetings, when deemed necessary, to disseminate disease information and biosecurity protocols. For biosecurity reasons, such a meeting may be in the form of a webinar or teleconference. Target audiences are:

- Producers
- Emergency response teams (industry, state, and federal)
- Other state and federal agencies
- Universities
- Private veterinarians
- Feed and pet stores
- Fair Board
- Other interested stakeholders

After the outbreak has ended, public information records will be collected by the PIO and retained per the state records retention schedule. All public information media releases will be maintained in an electronic format when possible.
Appendix 1: Protocol for Statewide or Regional Emergency Quarantine Rule

**In accordance with National Standstill Order as issued by the U.S. Department of Agriculture**

**Introduction:**

If a Foreign Animal Disease (FAD) is diagnosed or suspected in the United States and/or Washington it may become necessary for the Washington State Department of Agriculture (WSDA) to temporarily pause the movement of animals into (interstate) and within (intrastate) the state. This can be accomplished by adopting an emergency rule under RCW 16.36.040 and RCW 34.05.350 designating a statewide or regional quarantine area and establishing criteria for movement controls.

Quarantine and movement controls are critical to stopping disease transmission. In order to gather critical information for a unified approach to a FAD response, Washington state will follow a movement control protocol to inhibit further disease transmission before effective control measures can be successfully implemented.

Nationwide, the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) uses the following definition for animal movement controls:

- **Standstill Order**: discontinuing all transportation of susceptible animal species (animals capable of becoming infected with/or biological carriers of the FAD) on roadways while the Order is in place.

In Washington, WSDA uses the following definition for animal movement controls:

- **Quarantine**: the placing and restraining of any animal or its reproductive products by the owner or agent of the owner within a certain described and designated enclosure or area within this state, or the restraining of any animal or its reproductive products from entering this state, as may be directed in an order by the director. A quarantine can be put in place by either a Quarantine Order or an emergency rule.
  
  - Emergency quarantine rule (RCW 34.05.350 and RCW 16.36.040): An emergency quarantine rule normally takes effect upon filing the appropriate documents with the Office of the Code Reviser. An emergency quarantine rule would designate a statewide or regional area within Washington state as the area under quarantine. It may also specify import restrictions on animals or animal reproductive products from other states. The documents would include a justification for utilizing the emergency rulemaking process and also rule language specifying the parameters of the quarantine. Parameters may include: species of quarantine animals, quarantine area(s), restriction details, any permitting allowances, etc. Emergency rules are in effect for 120 days and can only be extended under certain circumstances. Modifications can be made to an emergency rule by filing another emergency rule. In order to lift the quarantine, WSDA will have to file an emergency rule repeal. The emergency quarantine will automatically end after the 120-day time period.
  
  - Quarantine Order: A Quarantine Order is a form issued by the State Veterinarians Office. A Quarantine Order would be issued to a specific premises. The Quarantine Order shall remain in effect as long as the director deems necessary.

- **Hold order**: an order by the director to the owner to the owner or agent of the owner of animals or animal reproductive products which restricts the animals or products to a designated holding location pending an investigation by the director of the disease, disease exposure, well-being, movement, or import status of the animals or animal reproductive products. A Hold Order is a form issued by the State Veterinarians office. Hold orders are in effect for 14 days. A hold order may be replaced with another hold order or a quarantine order (RCW 16.36.010(3)).
Scope of Authority:
Washington State Department of Agriculture’s underlying authority for addressing foreign animal disease (FAD), chapter 16.36 RCW, provides two clear regulatory foundations for preventing and suppressing diseases affecting animals. These provisions are best interpreted if read together and harmonized:

- RCW 16.36.010(1) states that “the director shall supervise the prevention of the spread and the suppression of infectious, contagious, communicable, and dangerous diseases affecting animals within, in transit through, and imported into the state.” It goes on to authorize the director to issue quarantine orders and hold orders under subsections (2) and (3).

- Under RCW 16.36.098, a person to whom a quarantine order or hold order is issued may request a hearing. The hearing must take place as an emergency adjudicative proceeding under RCW 34.05.479.

The second basis for controlling and preventing disease is by the adoption of rules under RCW 16.36.040:

(1) The director may adopt and enforce rules necessary to carry out the purpose and provisions of this chapter, and including:

(a) Preventing the introduction or spreading of infectious, contagious, communicable, or dangerous diseases affecting animals in this state;

(b) Governing the inspection and testing of all animals within or about to be imported into this state.

The statutory definition of “quarantine,” recognizes that a quarantine may cover a regional area within the state or include the entire state and indicates that the quarantine is put in place by order of the director. The use of both an emergency rule and individual quarantine or hold orders, as illustrated in this protocol, are consistent with the statute.

The adoption of an emergency rule for a statewide or regional quarantine will depend on the epidemiology of a FAD outbreak in the U.S. and the proximity to Washington. When necessary, an emergency rule for a statewide or regional quarantine and individual quarantine or hold orders will allow WSDA and USDA to complete any necessary epidemiological and traceback investigations to determine if the FAD has entered Washington.

An emergency statewide or regional quarantine rule, consistent with the definition of “quarantine,” is of general applicability and not subject to individual appeal. Persons/animals subject to a statewide or regional quarantine adopted through emergency rulemaking would not have appeal rights outside of the ability to appeal an emergency rule. Persons may petition the governor requesting the immediate repeal of a rule adopted on an emergency basis under RCW 34.05.350(3). Any animals placed under a premise specific quarantine would need to be issued a Quarantine Order or Hold Order document and they would be allowed specific rights to a hearing to contest the Order. The Quarantine Order and Hold Order both include a Notice of Rights and Opportunity for Hearing form.

Assumptions and Timeframes:
All movements of susceptible animals that are in progress when an emergency quarantine rule is adopted should continue to move to their intended destinations. Destination premises should accept all movements of susceptible animals that are in progress at the time of the emergency quarantine rule adoption; this should be supported by Washington and other states as well as industry. Reverting animals or returning them to the point of origin poses serious animal welfare and logistical issues.

After the emergency quarantine rule goes into effect, a grace period of 24 hours will be allowed for animals already in transit to complete that movement by either returning to their point of origin or continuing to their destination. After this period of time and once the investigation is complete, low-risk movements may be restored for facilities and producers not infected or epidemiologically linked to the point source. This could be done by a permit if the emergency...
rule contains language regarding permit exceptions or modification of the emergency rule. Infected premises and other premises within the emergency quarantine area (including the determined response plan Control Area) that have been issued a Quarantine Order will be subject to a different timeline for release than the one outlined in this document and may require a permitting process as described in Chapter 4: Quarantine and Permitted Movement.

Any susceptible species not already in transit during the 24-hour grace period may be instructed to house in-place until otherwise determined by WSDA. This process functions under the assumption that both individual producers and production systems have Continuity of Operations and/or Continuity of Business plans including pre-established protocols to address interruptions to normal production timelines.

Classifications of a FAD Outbreak in relation to Washington State:

There are three classifications of a FAD detection that may prompt WSDA to issue an emergency rule for statewide or regional area quarantine and/or quarantine orders or hold orders:

1. a FAD detection in North America but not the U.S. (Continental),
2. a FAD detection in the U.S. but not Washington (Domestic), and
3. a FAD detection in Washington (In-State).

**Continental:** An animal with a FAD is confirmed in North America, but not in the U.S. WSDA is on alert, will take precautionary actions, and monitor the situation carefully.

**Domestic:** An animal with a FAD is confirmed in the U.S., but not in Washington state. WSDA may take defensive actions to prevent introduction depending on the epidemiology of the outbreak and proximity to Washington. As a result, any animal imports from the infected state(s) may be prohibited for a minimum of twice the maximum incubation period of the FAD. Imports of animal reproductive products from the infected state(s) may cease for a minimum of seven days to assess what biosecurity measures are in place to safely move low-risk products.

**In-State:** An animal with a FAD is presumed positive or confirmed positive within and dispersed widely throughout Washington state.

In addition to the notices and activities listed for the Continental and Domestic classifications, the communications and primary activities are expanded during an In-State classification.

During a **Continental FAD detection**, it is unlikely WSDA will issue an emergency rule for statewide or regional quarantine, but individual quarantine or hold orders may be issued or emergency import restriction rules adopted. Import restriction rules may include special import permits or requirements for FAD susceptible livestock species entering Washington state (with or without negative results to diagnostic tests) as deemed necessary to demonstrate a lack of evidence of infection. Emergency import restriction rule language would most likely be included in the rule language related to the emergency rule for statewide or regional quarantine.

During a **Domestic or In-State FAD detection**, it is likely WSDA may adopt an emergency rule establishing a statewide or regional area quarantine.

In either case, an emergency quarantine rule would consist of a temporary pause in livestock movement in Washington and proceed utilizing the following timeline:
This minimum of **72 total hours** from adopting the emergency quarantine rule to reassessing it, would allow receipt of epidemiological information from the infected farm(s) and the identification of possible connections, direct or indirect, to Washington. Other data would be reviewed, such as certificates of veterinary inspection (CVIs), producer records of movements, etc., to determine other high-risk contacts. High-risk contacts may include movements out of the infected state, out of the emergency quarantine area (including the disease Control Area as identified through activation of the Washington Foreign Animal Disease Response plan), or associations with an infected production system.

WSDA will reassess the emergency quarantine rule no sooner than 72 hours from adoption of the emergency rule. WSDA may also lift quarantine orders or hold orders issued to individual animal owners. At this time WSDA may:

- Repeal the emergency quarantine rule and allow movements to resume.
- Extend the emergency quarantine through withdrawal of current rule and issuance of a new emergency rule (see RCW 34.05.350(2) for restrictions)
- Enact a permitting system as described in Chapter 4: Quarantine and Permitted Movement and allow permitted movements to resume, based on risk assessment

**Roles of Response Partners:**

Roles and responsibilities of response partners for an FAD event are detailed in Appendix 12: Response Partners Roles and Responsibilities. The table found in this appendix illustrates response capabilities of federal and state response partners as coordinated through the State Emergency Operations Center as adopted into Emergency Support Function (ESF) 11 (Agriculture and Natural Resources): Appendix 2 – State Animal Health Response Plan Appendix to the Comprehensive Emergency Management for Washington state.

The responsibilities outlined in the table align with the Core Capabilities that ESF 11 most directly supports, and the agencies and organizations identified to provide services and resources in accordance with their individual missions, legal authorities, plans, and capabilities in coordination through the State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC).

**Role of Peace Officers in Washington:**

Under **RCW 16.36.100**, the Director of Agriculture may request support in enforcing the emergency rule for a statewide or regional quarantine. This may include coordination with the Washington State Patrol (WSP), the Washington Department of Fish and Wildlife (WDFW), the Department of Natural Resources (DNR), and other agencies with peace officer enforcement capabilities. Coordination with local law enforcement and other local jurisdiction authorities will prove essential to provide initial road closure and perimeter control for identified isolation and quarantine areas as defined by unified command to control the spread of the disease.
Monitoring and/or restricting animal movements within (intrastate) and into (interstate) Washington state will ensure vehicles transporting susceptible species or animal reproductive products are controlled on Washington state road infrastructure within the designated timeframe. Movement may not resume until cleared by WSDA through reassessment of the emergency quarantine rule or issuance of a permit.

- **Intrastate movement of susceptible animal species**: Starting **24** hours after the emergency quarantine rule is adopted, coordinated peace officer response with subject matter support from WSDA, will monitor for susceptible species on Washington roads for a minimum of **48** hours. This will remain in effect until WSDA repeals the emergency quarantine rule by filing an emergency repeal with the Office of the Code Reviser. Premises under a Quarantine Order or Hold Order will have to be released by the State Veterinarians Office.

- **Interstate movement of susceptible animal species**: Starting **24** hours after the emergency rule is adopted, coordinated peace officer response with subject matter support from WSDA, will ensure no susceptible species are imported into Washington for a minimum of **48** hours. This will remain in effect until WSDA repeals the emergency quarantine rule. Premises under a Quarantine Order or Hold Order will have to be released by the State Veterinarians Office.

Movement controls may include signed and posted stop movement checkpoints throughout the state and along borders with neighboring states (RCW 16.36.045). The locations may not be preannounced to the general public. Livestock transports on Washington state roadways outside established checkpoints may also be subject to movement control monitoring efforts to ensure compliance with the emergency quarantine rule.

All animal movements through the checkpoint may be stopped. Those carrying species not susceptible to the FAD and not subject to the emergency quarantine will be allowed to continue. Those carrying species susceptible to the FAD and subject to the emergency quarantine will be required to provide proof of authorized animal movement as specified in the emergency quarantine. A Certificate of Veterinary Inspection (CVI) would not be adequate documentation for proof of authorized movement; documentation would be limited to permits issued by the Office of the State Veterinarian. Vehicle information for any movement carrying susceptible species would be recorded, reported to WSDA, and proof of authorized movement validated with WSDA. Any transporter that could not provide proof of authorized movement would be required to return the animal(s) to premise of origin or handled at the discretion of WSDA. The producer or company responsible for the unauthorized movement may face penalties, as determined by WSDA.

**Penalties for violating the Emergency Quarantine Rule, Quarantine Order, or Hold Order**

Any transporter found in violation of the emergency quarantine rule, Quarantine Order, or Hold Order may be ordered back to the premises of origin or to their destination premises at the discretion of WSDA or by any peace officer acting on behalf of WSDA. Any person found in violation of the emergency quarantine rule, quarantine order, or hold order may be subject to penalties in accordance with the underlying authorities. This may include a civil penalty up to $1,000.00 per violation or per head of livestock (RCW 16.36.113 and chapter 16-90 WAC).

**Communications:**

The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) will formally announce a Continental, Domestic, or In-State FAD outbreak classification. If a Domestic or In-State FAD outbreak classification were to occur and require the issuance of an emergency quarantine rule, internal Washington state government communication and communication external to the state government will occur in the following manner:

- **Internal**: The State Veterinarian will work with the agency rules coordinator to develop the emergency rule language and emergency order. Concurrent coordination with the agency Rapid Response & Emergency Management Program will occur to initiate activation of Emergency Support Function (ESF) 11 to coordinate...
requests for any additional resources needed to implement the emergency quarantine rule. The State Veterinarian will discuss adoption of an emergency quarantine rule with the Director of Agriculture before implementation. The Director is the person responsible for signing the emergency rulemaking document. Before the emergency quarantine rule is adopted, the State Veterinarian, Rapid Response & Emergency Management Program and the Communications Office will coordinate a communication plan in preparation of response partner and stakeholder notification.

- **External**: WSDA will notify response partners, including but not limited to WSP, WDFW, and DNR to start mobilizing resources to ensure no susceptible animal species are on Washington roads for a minimum of 48 hours after the initial 24 hours of the emergency rule. The Office of the State Veterinarian, through coordination with the WSDA Communications Office, will communicate with the following external stakeholders: industry, producers, industry groups, and the general public. Industry and producers, including industry and state agency partners in adjoining states, would be notified of the emergency quarantine rule by the State Veterinarian. This communication would be disseminated via a WSDA press release, multiagency coordination group, and through other industry group contacts. The general public would be notified of the emergency quarantine rule and its justification through a variety of media outlets such as press releases, radio and television interviews, web messaging, and social media.

**Resuming movements:**
After all aspects of the epidemiological investigation (trace outs, tracebacks, etc.) are completed, movements may either resume as normal or resume on a permitted basis as described in Chapter 4: Quarantine and Permitted Movement.

- **Normal movements**: If WSDA has determined a FAD outbreak is not epidemiologically linked to any herd or premises within the state, all intrastate movements may resume as normal once the emergency rule is lifted.
- **Permitted movements**: If WSDA has determined a herd or premises is positive for the FAD or epidemiologically linked to a positive premise, movements may be allowed on a permitted basis as described in Chapter 4: Quarantine and Permitted Movement. To expedite movements, WSDA may start accepting permit requests when the emergency quarantine rule is first adopted to assess if the movements meet the minimum requirements after the emergency quarantine rule has been repealed.
**Premise Designation and Zones**

A critical component of a FAD response is the designation of zones, areas, and premises. The Incident Commander works with the Operations Section and Planning Section to (1) determine appropriate zones, areas, and premises designations in the event of a FAD outbreak and (2) reevaluate these designations as needed throughout the outbreak based on the epidemiological situation. These zones, areas, and premises designations are used in quarantine and movement control efforts. For details on the zones, areas, and premises, see the [FAD PReP - NAHEMS Guidelines: Quarantine and Movement Control](#).

**Quarantines**

Premises and zones shall be quarantined when there is a confirmed diagnosis of a FAD.

**Overview of Premises Designations:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Premises</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Zone</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Infected Premises (IP)</td>
<td>Premises where a presumptive positive case or confirmed positive case exists based on laboratory results, compatible clinical signs, case definition, and international standards.</td>
<td>Infected Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact Premises (CP)</td>
<td>Premises with susceptible animals that may have been exposed to the FAD, either directly or indirectly, including but not limited to exposure to animals, animal products, fomites, or people from Infected Premises.</td>
<td>Infected Zone, Buffer Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suspect Premises (SP)</td>
<td>Premises under investigation due to the presence of susceptible animals reported to have clinical signs compatible with the FAD. This is intended to be a short-term premises designation.</td>
<td>Infected Zone, Buffer Zone, Surveillance Zone, Vaccination Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At-Risk Premises (ARP)</td>
<td>Premises that have susceptible animals, but none of those susceptible animals have clinical signs compatible with the FAD. Premises objectively demonstrates that it is not an Infected Premises, Contact Premises, or Suspect Premises. At-Risk Premises may seek to move susceptible animals or products within the Control Area by permit. Only At-Risk Premises are eligible to become Monitored Premises.</td>
<td>Infected Zone, Buffer Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitored Premises (MP)</td>
<td>Premises objectively demonstrates that it is not an Infected Premises, Contact Premises, or Suspect Premises. Only At-Risk Premises are eligible to become Monitored Premises. Monitored Premises meet a set of defined criteria in seeking to move susceptible animals or products out of the Control Area by permit.</td>
<td>Infected Zone, Buffer Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free Premises (FP)</td>
<td>Premises outside of a Control Area and not a Contact or Suspect Premises.</td>
<td>Surveillance Zone, Free Area</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Overview of Zones:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Zone/Area</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Infected Zone (IZ)</td>
<td>Zone that immediately surrounds an Infected Premises.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buffer Zone (BZ)</td>
<td>Zone that immediately surrounds an Infected Zone or a Contact Premises.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control Area (CA)</td>
<td>Consists of an Infected Zone and a Buffer Zone.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surveillance Zone (SZ)</td>
<td>Zone outside and along the border of a Control Area. The Surveillance Zone is part of the Free Area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free Area (FA)</td>
<td>Area not included in any Control Area. Includes the Surveillance Zone.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 2: Vaccine Use

NOTE: The Washington FMD Vaccination Plan is currently under development between WSDA, USDA, DOH and Washington State University.

WSDA and USDA APHIS' primary response strategy to a FAD outbreak is rapid stamping out. Under some epidemiological circumstances during a FAD outbreak, an emergency vaccination strategy could be considered. Emergency vaccination requires vaccinated animal traceability and the diagnostic capability to differentiate infected and vaccinated animals (also known as a DIVA strategy) for movement between zones, interstate commerce, and international trade.

Differentiation of infected from vaccinated animals (DIVA) testing is preferred for an effective emergency vaccination strategy. The WSDA Director, State Veterinarian, Tribal officials and the APHIS VS Deputy Administrator (the U.S. CVO) and industry partners must agree on the decision to vaccinate.

For specific information on vaccine use, see FAD PReP – NAHEMS Guidelines: Vaccination for Contagious Diseases.
Appendix 3: Permitted Movement

In a foreign animal disease (FAD) outbreak, the three goals of a response are to (1) detect, control, and contain the FAD in animals as quickly as possible; (2) eradicate the FAD using strategies that seek to stabilize animal agriculture, the food supply, and the economy, and to protect public health and the environment; and (3) provide science- and risk-based approaches and systems to facilitate continuity of business (COB) for non-infected animals and non-contaminated animal products.

Permits are the mechanism by which movements are allowed during a FAD outbreak.

For specific information on permitted movement, see FAD PReP Manual 6-0 – Permitted Movement.
Appendix 4: Surveillance, Epidemiology, and Tracing

Once an animal is presumed positive for a FAD, or a FAD agent has been isolated and identified, appropriate Federal resources may be mobilized in support of the local response depending on the situation. Surveillance, epidemiology, and tracing components of a FAD response must be implemented quickly. They provide a real-time understanding of the situation and enable the earliest possible and most appropriate intervention strategies to be implemented (e.g., quarantine, movement control, vaccination, stamping-out, etc.).

Surveillance, epidemiology, and tracing techniques will be employed in a FAD outbreak to:

- Detect new and existing cases (animals or premises).
- Understand characteristics of the disease (e.g., clinical signs, incubation period, populations affected) and outbreak characteristics (e.g., sources, disease incidence patterns, geographic distribution, transmission dynamics, and reservoirs) and how they affect specific populations.
- Identify risk factors associated with disease occurrence (e.g., age, production practices, species, wildlife, vectors).
- Provide information for decision-making to design and implement control measures against the disease being targeted, such as designation of zones for disease control procedures.
- Evaluate the effectiveness of the control measures implemented and adjust them as the situation dictates.

For specific information on surveillance, epidemiology, and tracing, see FAD PReP – NAHEMS Guidelines: Surveillance, Epidemiology, and Tracing.
Appendix 5: Biosecurity

Biosecurity refers to the measures put in place to protect livestock against exposure to endemic and emerging diseases, and to limit the spread of these diseases within the livestock population. During an outbreak of FAD, it is the producer’s responsibility to protect their animals from becoming infected by focusing on management practices designed to prevent the introduction and spread of disease agents onto or off of the ranch.

Routine Biosecurity

All producers will follow biosecurity best practices as outlined in the USDA APHIS Biosecurity Standard Operating Procedures. Enhanced biosecurity will be implemented during a suspect and confirmed FAD diagnosis.

Enhanced Biosecurity

During times of outbreak the following resources will be used to guide officials on how to instruct producers in enhanced biosecurity:

- USDA FAD PReP Response Plan
- USDA FAD PReP Standard Operating Procedures: Biosecurity
- FADPReP NAHEMS Guidelines: Biosecurity

In addition to these references, each commercial producer should have their own, site specific, biosecurity plan in place.
Appendix 6: Mass Depopulation and Euthanasia

Euthanasia and depopulation (also known as “culling”) may be practiced during an animal health emergency, such as a major disease outbreak or a foreign animal disease (FAD), to help prevent or mitigate the spread of the disease through the elimination of infected, exposed, or potentially exposed animals. It also serves to remove contaminated livestock from the food supply, protect the nation’s agricultural and national economy, and safeguard public health.

The goals of euthanasia are:

- Provide humane treatment of animals at all times until they are euthanized
- Select and use an acceptable form of depopulation/euthanasia to be executed as quickly, efficiently, and humanely as possible
- Minimize the negative emotional and psychological impact on animal owners, caretakers, and the public
- Prevent adulterated or potentially adulterated meat products from entering the food chain
- Prevent or mitigate disease spread in the event of the introduction of a FAD within the U.S.

Personnel should be familiar with the species of livestock being depopulated, and proficient in the method(s) selected.

It is important to understand that USDA APHIS and WSDA recognize the difference between euthanasia and depopulation. Euthanasia involves transitioning an animal to death as painlessly and stress-free as possible. Mass depopulation is a method by which large numbers of animals must be destroyed quickly and efficiently with as much consideration given to the welfare of the animals as practicable.

For specific information mass depopulation and euthanasia, please see FAD PReP – NAHEMS: Mass Depopulation and Euthanasia.
Appendix 7: Disposal

During a FAD outbreak, disposal measures are implemented to prevent the introduction of or mitigate the spread of the pathogen by elimination of infected, or potentially infected, animal carcasses and associated materials. Disposal also serves to remove potentially contaminated feed or food products from the animal feed and human food supply chains. In the event of a FAD outbreak, waste material such as animal carcasses will be produced if mass euthanasia and depopulation are chosen to mitigate disease. It is likely that some animals will perish due to infection with the FAD, and these will also require proper disposal. In addition to animal carcasses, related waste materials such as milk, feed materials, or wool and hair, will also need to be securely disposed of.

The overall goal of disposal operations during an animal health incident is to eliminate all animal carcasses and related material in a timely, safe, bio-secure, aesthetically acceptable, and environmentally responsible manner.

Disposal has the following preparedness goals:

- Establish disposal protocols or procedures before an outbreak, for consistency and safeguarding, and to meet regulatory requirements.
- Identify suitable locations where disposal activities may be conducted.
- Identify suitable disposal personnel, supplies, materials, and equipment prior to the incident or FAD outbreak.
- Prevent the further spread of the disease agent, with little or no effect on the environment, considering community preferences, and conserving meat or animal protein if logistically supportable from a biosecurity viewpoint.

Disposal has the following response goal:

- Properly dispose of contaminated and potentially contaminated materials, including animal carcasses, as quickly as possible while maximizing pathogen containment, environmental sustainability, stakeholder acceptance, and cost effectiveness.

Qualified personnel must be proficient and knowledgeable in all aspects of potential disposal options. Decision makers must be comfortable choosing the quickest, safest, and most environmentally responsible disposal methods practicable given the circumstances. It is crucial that appropriate disposal decisions are made by qualified personnel and that negative environmental impacts and biosecurity risks associated with each disposal option are carefully considered during the planning process. Failure to properly account for important factors related to a disposal option may have devastating effects on the environment and create undesirable breaches in biosecurity.

For specific information disposal, please see the following resources:

- FAD PReP – NAHEMS Guidelines: Disposal
- WSDA Disposal Sources for Animal Mortality Events
- WSDA Carcass Disposal Guidelines
Appendix 8: Cleaning and Disinfecting

The potential for spread or transfer of microorganisms, especially highly contagious pathogens, can occur from the direct or indirect contamination of a premises, equipment, vehicles, personnel, and the movement of animals or animal products. C&D procedures are used to inactivate or destroy microorganisms, thereby inhibiting or eliminating their further spread. These efforts are vital for disease control and eradication measures.

When correctly implemented, C&D procedures can be a cost-effective means of minimizing pathogenic threats. Personnel involved with C&D functions must be knowledgeable about general C&D principles, methods, and procedures for the variety of situations that may occur during an animal health emergency.

Refer to the following federal resources for specific guidance:

- FAD PReP - NAHEMS Guidelines: Cleaning and Disinfection
- FAD PReP Standard Operating Procedures: 15. Cleaning and Disinfection
Appendix 9: Communications

Public Relations Response and Communication

The following will guide public information activities during a FAD outbreak:

- WSDA will strive to keep federal, state, local, and industry representatives informed of the situation.
- A public information team will be formed and the Public Information Officer (PIO) appointed. The public information team should consist of appropriate representatives from WSDA, USDA, and the affected industry.
- The public information team will prepare and electronically maintain a copy of press releases and a time-log of public information activities.
- The PIO will brief the news media as new information becomes available.
- The State Veterinarian or other designated subject matter expert shall be available to deal with technical questions that might be posed to the PIO.
- Information released to the public should be timely and include at least the following general information:
  - The nature and extent of the emergency;
  - Impacted or potentially affected areas of the state;
  - Human health implications or lack thereof; and
  - Activities carried out by government officials and industry leaders to respond to the outbreak and mitigate its effects.
  - The use of radio and television may include prepared announcements, interviews, question and answer sessions, and live footage.
- After the outbreak has ended, public information records will be collected by the PIO and filed. All public information media releases will be maintained in an electronic format when possible.
Appendix 10: Forms
Quarantine Order

Quarantine Order

Animals or animal reproductive products that may have been exposed to or affected by an infectious, contagious, communicable or dangerous disease are considered to be an immediate danger to the livestock industry, public health, safety and welfare of this state. In order to suppress or prevent the spread of disease, any such exposed or affected animal(s) or animal reproductive products shall be immediately quarantined.

Order issued to:

Owner/Agent

Mailing Address, City, State, Zip Code

Physical Address

County

Phone Number

Email Address

Animals Quarantined:

Location of Confined Animals:

Disease for which animals tested positive, or may be exposed to or affected by:

Quarantine Instructions:

IT IS ORDERED, by the powers vested in me under chapter 16.36 RCW as an authorized representative of the Director of the Department of Agriculture, that the above-described animals or animal reproductive products are quarantined, and shall not be allowed to be removed from the above-described location, without written release from the director.

Questions concerning the status of the quarantine should be directed to the State Veterinarian's Office, Animal Services Division, Washington State Department of Agriculture, PO Box 42577, Olympia, WA 98504-2577, phone (360) 902-1878.

For

WASHINGTON STATE VETERINARIAN

Dated__________________ By__________________

AFFIDAVIT OF RECEIPT

QUARANTINE ORDER AND NOTICE OF RIGHTS AND REQUEST FOR HEARING

The undersigned states that on __________________, I personally received the above Quarantine Order, Notice of Rights and Opportunity for Hearing (reverse side of this page), and Request for Hearing Form.

______________________________
Signature of Owner/Agent

ASR-101. (9/6/18) DISTRIBUTION: WHITE = OWNER/AGENT CANARY = STATE VETERINARIAN Page 1 of 2
Hold Order

The director may issue a hold order when: (1) overt disease or exposure to disease in an animal is not immediately obvious but there is reasonable cause to investigate whether an animal is diseased or has been exposed to disease; (2) when import health papers, permits, or other transportation documents required by law or rule are not complete or are suspected to be fraudulent; or (3) when further transport of an animal would jeopardize the well-being of the animal or other animals in Washington state.

A hold order is in effect for fourteen days and expires when released by the director or no later than midnight on the fourteenth day from the date of the hold order. A hold order may be replaced with a quarantine order for the purpose of animal disease control.

Order issued to:

Owner/Agent

Mailing Address, City, State, Zip Code

County          Phone Number          Email Address

Animals held:

Location of
Confined Animals:

Hold Order:

☐ Possible Exposure to Disease  ☐ Import or Movement Status

Disease to which
animals may be
exposed or affected by:

Hold Instructions:

CONCLUSION: IT IS ORDERED, by the powers vested in me under chapter 16.36 RCW as an authorized representative of the Director of the Department of Agriculture, that the above-described animals or animal reproductive products are held, and shall not be removed from the above-described location without written release from the director. The above-described animals shall remain under hold order, which remains in effect for fourteen days and expires when released by the Director or no later than midnight on the fourteenth from the date of the hold order or further action is taken pursuant to chapter 16.36 RCW. This hold order expires at midnight on: ________________________.

Questions concerning the status of this hold order should be directed to the State Veterinarian’s Office, Animal Services Division, Washington State Department of Agriculture, PO Box 42577, Olympia, WA 98504-2577, phone (360) 902-1878.

For ________________________________

WASHINGTON STATE VETERINARIAN

Dated ____________________________  By ________________________________

AFFIDAVIT OF RECEIPT

HOLD ORDER AND NOTICE OF RIGHTS AND REQUEST FOR HEARING

The undersigned states that on ____________________________ I personally received the above Hold Order, Notice of Rights and Opportunity for Hearing (reverse side of this page), and Request for Hearing Form.

Signature of owner or agent

AGS-204 (06/18)  DISTRIBUTION: WHITE—OWNER/AGENT  CANARY—STATE VETERINARIAN  Page 1 of 2
Hold Order - Notice of Rights and Opportunity for Hearing

You have the right to request a regular administrative hearing or an emergency hearing, or both.

A regular administrative hearing is to determine whether the findings are true and whether the Washington State Department of Agriculture (Department) should take the actions described in the Order. An emergency hearing is limited to whether the sanctions or requirements in the emergency order should be in effect pending a full hearing.

You may submit a Request for Hearing in one of the following ways:

1. Email it as an attachment, or in the body of an email to: ahealth@agr.wa.gov
2. Mail it to:
   Washington State Veterinarian
   Washington State Department of Agriculture
   Animal Services Division
   P.O. Box 42577
   Olympia, WA 98504-2577
3. Fax it to:
   (360) 502-2087

Regular Hearing: If you wish to request a regular administrative hearing, you must submit a request in writing. Your request for a regular administrative hearing must be received by the Department within twenty-five (25) days of service of this notice. If mailed, it must be postmarked within twenty-five (25) days of service of this notice. The date of service of this notice is the date the Department deposited this notice in the mail (date noted on the Certificate of Service), or the date the Department hand delivered this notice. Your 25-day deadline to request a hearing is calculated from this date. Failure to adhere to this deadline will constitute a waiver of your right to a hearing.

Emergency Hearing: If you wish to request an emergency hearing, you must submit a request in writing. An emergency hearing is to determine whether the sanctions or requirements in the emergency order should be in effect pending a regular hearing. Your request for an emergency hearing must be received by the Department within five (5) days of service of this notice. If mailed, it must be postmarked within five (5) days of service of this notice. The date of service of this notice is the date the Department deposited this notice in the mail (date noted on the Certificate of Service), or the date the Department hand delivered this notice. Your 5-day deadline to request a hearing is calculated from this date. Failure to adhere to this deadline will constitute a waiver of your right to an emergency hearing.

If you request an emergency hearing in a timely manner, a hearing will be scheduled as quickly as feasible. If you request a regular administrative hearing in timely manner, a hearing will be scheduled and you will receive at least seven (7) days advance notice of the date, time, and place of the hearing. You may be represented by an attorney or another authorized representative at the hearing if you desire. The hearing will be as informal as is practical within the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), chapter 18.06 RCW. The hearing will be recorded. You have the right to present evidence and witnesses on your behalf and to cross-examine those witnesses presented in support of the Department. You may require the attendance of witnesses by subpoena.

If either you do not request a hearing or your written hearing request is not postmarked or received within the deadlines stated above, this will constitute a waiver of your right to a hearing and the Director will find that you do not contest the Department's enforcement actions.

Interpreter Availability: If you or a witness for you is a person who cannot readily speak, hear, read, understand, or communicate in the English language, a qualified interpreter may be appointed at no cost to you or your witness. You may request a qualified interpreter on the attached Request for Hearing.
Appendix 11: Reportable Diseases

In Washington, [WAC 16-70-020](#) outlines the complete list of diseases of interest to the state and details the authority of the State Veterinarian to request reports on disease of concern associated with overall disease control measures.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Emergency Conditions or Disease</th>
<th>Multiple and Other Species</th>
<th>Bovine</th>
<th>Caprine/ovine</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anthrax</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Crimean Congo hemorrhagic fever</td>
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<tr>
<td>Foot-and-mouth disease</td>
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<tr>
<td>Heartwater</td>
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<tr>
<td>Japanese encephalitis</td>
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<tr>
<td>Livestock exposed to toxic substances which may threaten public health</td>
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<tr>
<td>Malignant catarrhal fever (all forms)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mycobacterium tuberculosis</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rabies in any species (excluding bats)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rift Valley fever</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rinderpest (cattle plague)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Screwworm myiasis (Cochliomyia hominivorax or Chrysomya bezziana)</td>
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<td>Surra (Trypanosoma evansi)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Theileriosis (Corridor disease, East Coast fever)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unexplained increase in dead or diseased animals</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vancomycin resistant (Staphylococcus aureus)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vesicular stomatitis</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Other Species:</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Viral hemorrhagic disease of rabbits (calicivirus)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Porcine</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>African swine fever</td>
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<tr>
<td>Classical swine fever (hog cholera)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nipah virus</td>
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<tr>
<td>Swine vesicular disease</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vesicular exanthema of swine</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Poultry</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Exotic Newcastle disease (Viscerotropic velogenic Newcastle disease)</td>
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<tr>
<td>High pathogenic avian influenza and low pathogenic avian influenza</td>
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<tr>
<td>Turkey rhinotracheitis</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Equine</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>African horse sickness</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dourine (Trypanosoma equiperdum)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Equine piroplasmosis (Theileria equi and Babesia caballii)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Glanders (Farcy) (Pseudomonas mallei)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hendra virus (Equine morbillivirus)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

For a list of diseases that are reportable to the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE), see the following resource, [OIE List of Notifiable Terrestrial and Aquatic Animal Diseases](#).

For a list of diseases reportable to USDA, see the following resource, [U.S. National List of Reportable Animal Diseases (NLRAD) - National Animal Health Reporting System (NAHRS) Reportable Diseases, Infections, and Infestations List](#).
Appendix 12: Response Partner Roles and Responsibilities

Appendix 2 (State Animal Response Plan) of Emergency Support Function (ESF) 11 Annex to the Washington State Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan (CEMP) provides guidelines for a rapid response and recovery to an animal health event affecting the health, safety, and welfare of humans, animals and free ranging wildlife populations.

Activation of this appendix may also involve the identification and control of diseases of public health significance as some Foreign Animal Diseases (FADs) are zoonotic. Preparedness and response issues of major concern in a FAD outbreak include: prevention of disease introduction, disease monitoring and surveillance, rapid identification, disease containment and eradication and, when necessary, disposal of animal carcasses.

In the event of a Foreign Animal Disease in Washington state, Washington State Dept. of Agriculture (WSDA) will activate ESF 11 Appendix 2 and coordinate with response partner agencies as needed for assistance in controlling the outbreak.

The following details the responsibilities and actions of response partners agencies identified to provide services and resources in accordance with their individual missions, legal authorities, plans, and capabilities in coordination through the SEOC as outlined in ESF 11 Appendix 2 for an animal health event, including considerations for carcass disposal.

**Washington State Department of Agriculture**

The WSDA is the agency with primary responsibility for an animal health event and reportable disease control in livestock within the state of Washington.

**Animal Health Events**

- Issue quarantines, embargoes or hold orders and oversee the implementation and enforcement of restricted, embargoed or quarantined areas as determined necessary by the MAC group, with the assistance of the other state and federal supporting agencies.
- Coordinate WSDA emergency management activities with ESF 6, ESF 8 and local jurisdictions.
- Coordinate multi-state event response and recovery efforts with local, state and federal animal response agencies and appropriate emergency management agencies.
- Coordinate press releases with the SEOC ESF 15 and the Joint Information Center (JIC), when established.

**Carcass Disposal**

- Take the lead in the emergency disposal of animals that died from disease or unknown causes.
- Identify the most appropriate and expeditious disposal method for animal carcasses, in consultation with the Department of Ecology and local public health officials.
- Oversee emergency disposal operations and report number of animals disposed to the SEOC ESF 11 Lead.

**Washington State Department of Fish and Wildlife**

**Animal Health Events**

- Provide advice on risks to wildlife and methods to mitigate the risks and prevent the spread of the disease to susceptible wildlife.
- Initiate a wildlife disease surveillance program when a FAD could potentially affect wildlife.
- Coordinate multi-state event response and recovery efforts with local, state and federal animal response agencies.
- Coordinate press releases with the SEOC ESF 15 and the JIC.
- Establish credentialing standards for animal response personnel.

**Carcass Disposal**

- Assist coordinating agency, as requested, with emergency disposal operations involving wildlife carcasses.
Fish and Wildlife

- Establish and maintain channels of communication with state and federal agencies that are dealing with the disease outbreak in domestic animals.
- Maintain an awareness of wildlife conditions in the region and the species of wildlife having emergency animal disease significance.
- Use familiarity with the topography, wildlife density, and methods of wildlife control and dispersal in order to manage the AHE in the wildlife population at risk.
- Recommend the general area(s) to be included in the quarantine and/or buffer zones around the outbreak when wildlife becomes involved and recommend methods to minimize wildlife movements into/out of these areas to reduce potential pathogen spread.
- Determine the staffing and resource requirements for administration, diagnosis, depopulation, disposal and enforcement in the event of an emergency animal disease outbreak involves wildlife.
- Establish procedures for conducting surveys of the wildlife populations in an outbreak area to determine prevalence of disease.
- Identify methods of humane collection and preservation of specimens for laboratory analysis.
- Plan for the collection of diagnostic specimens and identify laboratories capable of performing needed tests in a timely manner.
- Direct and coordinate efforts to control and depopulate a specific game animal in a given area.
- Advise and assist in depopulation of uncontrolled and unconfined non-game species.
- Conduct outreach and education to wildlife rehabilitators.
- Prepare news releases giving justification for testing and euthanizing wildlife, if indicated.

Washington State Department of Ecology

Animal Health Events

- Provide recommendations to the MAC group on to the most appropriate method(s) for disposal of affected carcasses.
- Assist local health jurisdictions in determining the suitability of either on site burial or transportation to an offsite burial location.
- Assist local health jurisdictions in identifying offsite burial locations and make recommendations, in conjunction with the Washington Department of Transportation (WSDOT), regarding specific transportation requirements.
- Assist the Washington National Guard (WNG) as staff resources are available, in assessing the safety of disinfectants used for cleaning and disinfection of vehicles, equipment and facilities.
- Assign personnel qualified to make environmental assessments to each destruction and/or disposal location as resources are available.

Carcass Disposal

- Provide assistance to the coordinating agency in identifying the animal carcass disposal method that minimize the impact on the environment.
- Provide any other assistance to the coordinating agency as deemed necessary, within the scope of capabilities and resources, in during disposal operations.

Washington State Department of Health

Animal Health Events

- Determine the public health risk and impact of a suspected FAD in the state of Washington.
- Coordinate with the local health jurisdiction to put disease control measures in place to prevent zoonotic disease transmission.
• Notify the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) of any FAD outbreak occurring within the boundaries of the state of Washington and provide information on the nature of the FAD, the primary animal host and the potential health risk to humans.
• Work with local jurisdictions to help assess the public health risk associated with burial or burning of dead animals and provide information on the risk and recommendations to the PDG.
• Establish any appropriate surveillance and control measures for human illnesses associated with an animal health event.

Washington State Department of Labor and Industries
Animal Health Events
• Provide responder and worker safety expertise and assistance to ensure worker health and safety on-scene.

Washington State Department of Social and Health Services
Animal Health Events
• Under a federal declaration, collaborate with the Department of Health and other mass care support agencies in the coordinated provision of crisis counseling resources during animal depopulation operations to mitigate emotional impacts among responders, producers and animal owners.

Washington State Department of Transportation
Animal Health Events
• Provide support, as available, for traffic control on state and federal highways in the restricted or quarantined areas.
• Provide expertise, as available, and assist in planning any required movement of carcasses off-site for disposal.
• Provide support as available, to law enforcement (local, county or state), WSDA and WNG personnel for traffic control into restricted and/or quarantined areas.

Carcass Disposal
• Assist with loading animal carcasses in/on vehicles for transport to disposal sites as available.

Washington State Emergency Management Division
General
• As host agency for the State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC), maintain minimum staffing levels for a monitoring posture (Level 3 Activation) as well as the facility itself. Raise activation level at onset of emergency/disaster, or upon request.
• Develop and coordinate finalization of Governor’s Proclamation of a State of Emergency.
• Serve as authorized representative for requesting interstate capabilities for agriculture, natural, and cultural resource protection through the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC).

Washington State Office of the Attorney General
Animal Health Events
• Provide direct legal support to the WSDA to assist agency staff in performance of their emergency support functions including:
  o Quarantines, emergency declarations and orders;
  o Urgent issues of statutory authority, delegation, jurisdiction and liability; and
  o Contracts and interagency agreement review.
• Function as the liaison between the WSDA and legal counsel representing federal and tribal governments.
United State Department of Agriculture

Animal Health Events

- Assume a role in the Unified Command.
- Detect animal disease anomalies and pests and assign FADDs to conduct investigations.
- Coordinate sample submission and laboratory testing and reporting with NVSL/FADDL/NAHLN.
- Coordinate with WSDA and other State and Federal agencies, industry and producers to eradicate the disease while supporting economic and trade interests of animal agriculture.
- Coordinate with WSDA and other State and Federal agencies to provide timely accurate and consistent communication, public information, and messaging
- Coordinate tasks with other ESFs, Washington state emergency veterinary response teams, and voluntary animal care organizations to respond.
- Coordinate with ESF #8 on zoonotic disease surveillance activities and animal/veterinary issues.

Washington State Conservation Commission

Animal Health Events

- Provide FAD outreach to the agricultural community through local conservation districts.
- Coordinate with all levels of government and the private sector to reduce or alleviate the effects of the FAD.

Washington State University, College of Veterinary Medicine

Animal Health Events

- Assist and advise the WSDA on the clinical aspects of the disease.
- Provide a liaison/technical expert when requested by WSDA.

Washington State University, Cooperative Extension Service

Animal Health Events

- Assist in educational efforts to notify both the public and livestock industries of the nature of the problem.

Washington State University, Washington Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory

Animal Health Events

- Assist WSDA and/or USDA, when requested, with diagnostic assistance and the collection and submission of appropriate samples for definitive diagnosis of a suspected FAD.
- Report suspected FAD to the State Veterinarian or USDA AD and forward suspect FAD samples received from local producers or veterinarians to the appropriate USDA/APHIS laboratory (Plum Island, New York, or Ames, Iowa).
- Quarantine and decontaminate laboratory facilities that processed confirmed FAD samples.
- Coordinate with the USDA NVSL during the initial investigative and management phases of an outbreak.

Washington State Utilities and Transportation Commission

Carcass Disposal

- Provide rate regulation and safety compliance for transportation haulers.
## Appendix 13: Response Partner Contact Information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response Partner</th>
<th>Contact Information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Washington State University (WSU) Veterinary School | • Charlie Powell  
Public Information Officer  
(509) 335-7073  
charlie_powell@wsu.edu |
| WSU Extension | • Dr. Dale Moore  
Extension Director  
Phone: (509) 335-7494  
Email: damoor@wsu.edu |
| Washington Veterinary Disease Diagnostic Laboratory (WADDL) | • Dr. Kevin Snekvik  
Director of Operations  
Phone: (509) 335-9696  
Email: ksnek@wsu.edu |
| USDA APHIS Veterinary Services – Region 6 | • Dr. Leonard Eldridge  
AVIC AK, OR, WA  
Phone: (360) 753-9430  
Email: Leonard.E.Eldridge@aphis.usda.gov |
| Washington Division of Emergency Management (EMD) | • Chris D. Utzinger  
Response Section Manager  
Phone: (253) 512-7033  
Email: Chris.Utzinger@mil.wa.gov |
| Washington Department of Transportation (WDOT) | • John Himmel  
State Agency Liaison  
Phone: (360) 705-7973  
Email: himmelj@wsdot.wa.gov |
| Washington Department of Health (WDOH) | • Scott Lindquist, MD, MPH  
State Communicable Disease Epidemiologist/TB Medical Consultant  
206-418-5406  
scott.lindquist@doh.wa.gov |
| Washington State Patrol (WSP) | • Tyler Ray  
State Agency Liaison  
Phone: (360) 704-2968  
Email: Tyler.Ray@wsp.wa.gov |
| Washington Department of Fish and Wildlife (WDFW) | • Dr. Kristin Mansfield  
Wildlife Veterinarian  
Phone: 509-998-2023  
Email: Kristin.mansfield@dfw.wa.gov  
• Captain Phil Johnson  
State Agency Liaison  
Phone: (360) 586-2003  
Email: Philip.johnson@dfw.wa.gov |
| Washington Department of Ecology | • William Hannah  
State Agency Liaison  
Phone: (360) 407-6038  
Email: whan461@ecy.wa.gov |
### Appendix 14: Ag Complexity Analysis Tool

#### Complexity Analysis Tool - Ag

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Incident Name</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Type of Incident</th>
<th>VAxFWT=TP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Ranking Element</strong></td>
<td><strong>Value of 0</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Responder Safety (State &amp; Ag incident responders)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Low exposure with simple hazards easily mitigated through understanding of livestock handling. No zoonotic agent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel resources for field and incident management</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Disease outbreak managed by regular in-state USDA and State animal health officials.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overtime of responders and/or cumulative fatigue of response</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Some extra work needed by responders and managers of incident.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incident Action Plans, ICS forms, Resource Tracking, SitReports, Epi &amp; Mapping</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Very limited need for documentation &amp; ICS forms - State &amp; USDA VS can handle via normal office staff.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current Organization Performance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Current organization performing within expectations and span of control, can develop and implement the IAP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ranking Element</td>
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<tr>
<td>Public Awareness through Public Information</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Mitigating outbreak can be easily done via public media messaging.</td>
<td>Messaging must be reinforced continuously and moderate amount work to inform via various means. Some closures of events.</td>
<td>Public awareness on incident is difficult and incident has negative implications on economy. Many closures of events and quarantines.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media interest / Public Interest</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>No controversy or media interest.</td>
<td>Media releases are issued, and media frequently contacting PIO. Conflict &amp; controversy present. Animal rights issues raised.</td>
<td>Media present or contacting PIO during operations periods. National media present or JIC activated. Animal rights issues heavily involved.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple jurisdictions directly impacted</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Incident is contained within one or two counties with minimal consequence management.</td>
<td>Three - five counties are directly impacted by incident with moderate consequence management needed.</td>
<td>State-wide Ag communities affected with large amount of consequence management for entire communities. The introduction of disease was intentional (Agroterrorism).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ag Critical Infrastructure (ACI) to be protected</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>No Food &amp; Ag Critical Infrastructure (ACI) affected within or outside of disease incident.</td>
<td>ACI is affected moderately with livestock movement restrictions to other states and countries. Some Ag product affected. Minimal international trade implications.</td>
<td>Numerous CI within or adjacent to the incident. Severe damage is likely without physical protective being taken. Extensive international trade implications.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objectives</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Objectives are easily achieved.</td>
<td>Objectives are moderately difficult to achieve.</td>
<td>Objectives are difficult to achieve or are eclipsed by new objectives each day. Conflicts between objectives and constraints exist.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Anticipated incidence and prevalence of the disease outbreak</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Low level of spread, new premises would occur slowly with low morbidity &amp; mortality-1 species affected. There are few premises (1-4) in close proximity (10 km) with susceptible species.</td>
<td>Moderate degree of spread with new premises popping up quickly. Affects multiple species between animals and indirect contact. There are several premises (5-9) in close proximity (10 km) with susceptible species.</td>
<td>Rapid spread. Multiple species affected. Spread through animals and indirect contact. There are many premises (&gt;10) in close proximity (10 km radius) with susceptible species.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Animal demographics</td>
<td>Low to medium density of production animal populations in affected areas</td>
<td>Medium to high density of production animal populations in affected areas. Low to medium risk of disease spread to production populations. Few industry premises impacted by quarantine and other disease response strategies.</td>
<td>High density of production populations in affected areas. High risk of disease spread to production populations. Many industry premises impacted by quarantine and other disease response activities.</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Species / populations impacted</td>
<td>Disease outbreak impacts one species or production setting.</td>
<td>Disease outbreak impacts one species in multiple production settings.</td>
<td>Disease outbreak impacts multiple species and/or multiple production settings</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disease introduction</td>
<td>Single disease introduction, appears to be naturally caused.</td>
<td>Few disease introductions detected, appear to be naturally caused.</td>
<td>Multiple disease introductions detected, source unknown, intentional introduction suspected.</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disease ecology and etiology</td>
<td>Disease is spread through direct contact. The disease ecology indicates slow moving. Little to no disease spread detected.</td>
<td>Indications that wildlife and/or other vectors are mildly involved with disease spread. Disease spread potential increased with direct and indirect contact.</td>
<td>Disease is aerosolized, rapidly spreading, and persists in the environment. Wildlife or other vectors play a larger role in spread. Introduction.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Anticipated duration of resource commitment</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>1-3 Days on scene or long term but low involvement of responders / State.</td>
<td>State needs moderate involvement and other duties take backseat. Could be long term outbreak but sporadic heavy involvement.</td>
<td>Greater than 7 day outbreak with heavy involvement of State.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incident / disease control &amp; eradication measures</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>No disease control measures outside of affected premises. No effect anticipated to Ag or general economy.</td>
<td>Disease control measures needed within and outside of affected premises. Some effect on overall livestock sector(s) involved.</td>
<td>Extensive control measures within the State and in control areas. Other states affected. Severe and imminent disease spread is likely without specialized resources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quarantines needed to control disease</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Occurring only on initial premises but planning taking place for additional premises.</td>
<td>Quarantines on a moderate scale.</td>
<td>Numerous quarantines to manage movements on &amp; off farms/operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livestock movement controls and permitting</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Not occurring other than on the 1-2 premises affected.</td>
<td>Livestock movement restrictions in control area and part of state. Movements permitted and special routing may be needed.</td>
<td>Large scale livestock movement restrictions &amp; permitting to use biosecure corridors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biosecurity procedures on infected, contact, and susceptible premises</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Minimal needed and minimal premises in need.</td>
<td>Moderate amount of biosecurity needed and a moderate amount of premises in need.</td>
<td>High number of premises will be needing biosecurity and state-wide ramped up biosecurity is needed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surveillance for disease &amp; diagnostic lab capacity</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Small number of animals to be sampled and tested. State laboratory capacity not a problem.</td>
<td>Moderate number of animals to be tested by specialized personnel and a drain on laboratory capacity in the State - hard to keep up.</td>
<td>Overwhelming need for high number of animals to be sampled and tested. State lab capacity is overwhelmed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Depopulation of affected animals and / or premises</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Only small number of affected animals need to be euthanized and necropsy (autopsy) performed.</td>
<td>Moderate number of animals to be depopulated/euthanized or a moderate number of premises affected. Some non-affected animals also need to be euthanized. Special depop procedures needed.</td>
<td>Large number of animals to be depopulated and / or large number of premises to be depopulated. Specialized depopulation procedures needed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carcass disposal operations for animals that died or had to be depopulated/euthanized</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Dead animals can be disposed of using normal operations at the premises.</td>
<td>Special carcass disposal will be needed for a moderate amount of animals. Need multiple options for disposal -- burial, landfill, composting, rendering, incineration. Local, State, and public health involved.</td>
<td>Large animals need special disposal options. Need multiple options for large number of carcasses / biomass. Involvement of local agencies, State, and public health.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virus Elimination and Cleaning and Disinfection (C&amp;D)Operations</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Contained to 1-2 premises and virus elimination and C&amp;D is being done by premises owners / managers of the operation.</td>
<td>Moderate number of premises are affected and quarantined with multiple control areas. All premises within the 6 mile control area needed stepped up virus elimination and C&amp;D (biosecurity).</td>
<td>Large number of premises affected and quarantined with many control areas. All premises within the numerous control areas need virus elimination and C&amp;D resources.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**POINT RANGES**

- **0-20%**
  - 0 to 79
  - Consider normal operations (Type 5)
  - **TOTAL POINTS** 0
- **21-40%**
  - 80 to 158
  - Consider changing to a Type 4 incident
- **41-60%**
  - 160 to 237
  - Consider changing to a Type 3 incident
- **61-80%**
  - 238 to 316
  - Consider changing to a Type 2 incident
- **81-100%**
  - 317 to 395
  - Consider changing to a Type 1 incident

Prepared by: Signature: Date / Time:

INCIDENT PRIORITIZATION RANKING