Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Response Cross-sector Playbook

Purpose

Mapping and analyzing systems of coordination across federal and state animal health, state and local public health, and state occupational health and safety organizations.

- Foster multi-disciplinary collaboration when preparing or responding to Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza outbreaks in domestic flocks or addressing other complex One Health challenges.
- Provide a visual representation of how cross-sector entities interact, making complex coordination systems easier to understand.
- Promote action planning to strengthen targeted areas of improvement.
- Offer quick, practical access to key approaches, resources, and tools to implement response activities.



Introduction

This resource supports animal health officials, public health officials, occupational health and safety officials, partner agencies, industry and responders manage and adapt their response to H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) when the virus is detected in domestic poultry populations. Establishing commonly accepted and understood response goals and guidelines helps broaden awareness of accepted objectives as well as potential problems.

This document serves as an easily referenced companion, not a replacement, to response plans, policies, guidelines, and strategies across jurisdictional authorities, including those found in U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) HPAI Response Plan (The Red Book).

Overview

Preparedness and response planning for foreign animal disease (FAD) incidents is crucial to protect public health, animal health, animal agriculture, the environment, the food supply, and the economy. This document provides an overview of science- and risk-based approaches from Washington State Department of Agriculture, Washington Department of Health, Washington Department of Labor and Industries, and local health jurisdictions to protect public health and the environment, and stabilize animal agriculture, the food supply, and the economy in an HPAI outbreak Washington state.

This document acknowledges a recent H5N1 strain of HPAI is present in wild birds worldwide and has caused outbreaks in U.S. domestic birds and dairy cattle. The core concepts to protect animal health and public found in this document are applicable to Washington's strategy to decrease the risk of H5N1 transmission to livestock and protect farm workers to help lower their risk of exposure.

The scope of this document is limited to HPAI outbreaks in domestic poultry. Different response goals, methods, and approaches are required for each species incident and each response effort is different. HPAI is extremely deadly in poultry and decimates entire flocks within a matter of days. There is no treatment for HPAI in poultry, with rapid appraisal and depopulation of affected flocks of ultimate importance in an HPAI outbreak. While dairy herds and other livestock can show clinical signs of infection, most are able to recover.

All preparedness, preventive and control measures are implemented under a One Health framework and tailored to the setting and the epidemiological situation. Industry outreach and engagement, enhanced biosecurity, worker safety education and compliance, statewide surveillance and collaboration with the private sector at all levels of government are crucial for mitigating the zoonotic risks of HPAI. This document discusses critical activities for an animal health emergency response but is not all-inclusive: detection; public information and media relations; quarantine and enhanced biosecurity measures; personal protective equipment and exposure reduction; depopulation; disposal; farm cleaning and disinfection and virus elimination; surveillance and continuity of business; recovery and restocking. Several critical activities with an emphasis on occupational health are also discussed: personnel testing; symptom monitoring and reporting; prophylaxis; HPAI A(H5N1) virus infection of personnel. Approaches and tools used to manage resources, information and data for a multi-agency/multi-jurisdictional response, an appendix of applicable legal authorities and guidance documents, and instructions to repurpose this resource as a template are found at the end of this document.

Key Elements

Critical Activities: First 72 Hours of Response

Use of appropriate critical activities and tools continues throughout HPAI response

Washington State adheres to USDA's Foreign Animal Disease Preparedness and Response Plan (FAD PReP) as the national preparedness and response strategy for HPAI and other FAD threats. During a response to an animal health emergency, many actions must occur in a deliberate, coordinated fashion. In the first 72 hours after the detection of HPAI in domestic flocks, Washington State Department of Agriculture must implement critical activities fundamental to the rapid control and containment of HPAI within Washington State. The figure below covers many important tasks and activities but is not all-inclusive, however, some activities – such as —such as epidemiology, surveillance, biosecurity, quarantine and movement control, and depopulation of affected flocks – are of ultimate importance in any HPAI outbreak. Detailed information on the critical activities can be found in the associated Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), the National Animal Health Emergency Management System (NAHEMS) Guidelines, and FAD PReP materials located at www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep.

0-24 hours

(first 24 hours of response activities following presumptive positive detection of HPAI in Washington)

Dectection and quarantine

- Premises suspected of having HPAI placed under hold order by state. Samples are submitted to NVSL and state NAHLN lab (WADDL)
- Establish quarantine and additional movement restrictions(e.g., 24-72 hours) for relevant zones and regions
- Notify cooperating agencies, industry, trading partners
- Start tracing activities (epidemiological investigation)
- Begin confirmatory diagnostics and further virus typing
- Initiate incident management organizational structures and processes

Appraisal and Compensation

- Flock apprasial process is initiated; every attempt should be made to collect invesntory and other data for indemnity so that fair market value can be paid for flock.

Depopulation

- Within 24 hours of a presumptive positive (case definition), flocks will be depopulated to limit the spread of the virus and further environmental contamination.

Maintain biosecurity

- Implement and enforce increased biosecurity measures

24-48 hours

Continuation of activities: depopulation, evaluate movement controls, ensure compensation process moves forward for indemnity

Disposal

- Based on the facility, location, housing, and other factors, carcasses are disposd of using one or more methods: composting, burial, incineration, rendering, or landfilling.

Surveillance

- Proceed with surveillance and tracing activities
- Execute timely and accurate data entry in EMRS2
- Continue confirmatory diagnostics

Public Information

- Initiate public awareness messaging and communication campaign

Maintain biosecurity

- Implement and enforce increased biosecurity measures
- Initiate continuity of business plans

48-72 hours

Continuation of activities: ramping up Incident Command and Incident Coordination Group, ensure compensation (including flock plan) process proceeds, ongoing depopulation and/or disposal activities, timely and accurate data entry in EMRS2, surveillance and tracing activities, public awareness campaign

Testing

- Required environmental samples are collected and tested to confirm that the virus is gone before further steps are taken to reestablish production

Maintain biosecurity

Implement and enforce increased biosecurity measures

Continuity of Business

- Continue initiation of continuity of business plans
- Ramp up permitting and continuity of business activities

Detection

State or federal officials respond to suspect case (domestic poultry with illness compatible with H5/H7 HPAI) and provide samples to Washington Animal Disease Diagnostic Lab (WADDL) – a National Animal Health Laboratory Network (NAHLN) laboratory. Samples are forwarded to National Veterinary Services Laboratories (NVSL) with results typically coming back in 24 hours. When the criteria for a presumptive positive HPAI case have been met, USDA APHIS VS and WSDA response activities begin. NVSL confirmation is needed for World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH) and trade notifications when detection occurs in "poultry". In Washington State, HPAI is listed as a disease reportable to animal health and public health officials under WAC chapters 16-70 and 246-101.

References and Authorities

USDA APHIS VS / Washington State Department of Agriculture (WSDA) Activities	Washington Dept. of Health (DOH) Activities	Local Health Jurisdiction (LHJ) Activities	Washington Labor & Industries (L&I) Activities

Hour 0 to 24 hours
• Issue hold order/quarantine upon testing
• Gather initial epi information regarding production type, risk factors, trace-in and trace out
• Ensure worker safety for USDA/WSDA responders
• Ensure WSDA/ USDA responder PPE use and compliance
• Enter test non-negative results in Reportable Animal Disease Database to notify DOH
• Notify LHJ, contact information may be provided by DOH
• Notify State EOC and County Emergency Management of non-negative results.
• Notify producer of detection, provide information on exposure risk and awareness of LHJ contact
• Assign Case Manager
• Initiate plans for depopulation and disposal
• Initiate 10 Km Control Area, quarantine commercial premises within the control area
• Notify tribal point of contact if Control Area intersects tribal land
Variable, likely within 48-72 hours:
• Upon NVSL confirmation, public information webpages updated and press release issued (as applicable)
• Initiate self-reporting tool/surveillance GIS map
• Facilitate cross-agency meeting with
	• Provide a representative to integrate into response structure with cooperating agencies to support worker health needs
	• Intake non-negative result and inform appropriate LHJ of the premise and associated information
	• Meet with LHJ if needed (likely with commercial premise)
	• Ensure LHJ staff are access to data management systems
	• Assess response structure
	  ○ If DOH activates into IMT, all resource needs will be identified, evaluated, and monitored
	  ○ If DOH does not activate into IMT, HPAI "Core Team" (ZD/VBD epi staff, Influenza epi staff, SPHV, +/- state epi) responds and provides updates to leadership and HPAI Readiness Group
		• Provide a representative to integrate into response structure with cooperating agencies to support worker health needs
		• Review DOH HPAI guidance documents
		• Assess symptom monitoring plans (e.g., access to REDCap, translation needs, etc.)
		• Assess internal supplies e.g. PPE, influenza testing supplies, and order as necessary
		• Establish epidemiological symptom screening methods
		• Establish contact with farm management
		• Establish contact with cooperating regulatory agencies
		• Notify DOH Office of Communicable Disease Epidemiology
		• Notify local emergency management.
		• Notify local board of health
		• Activate LHJ Emergency response system
		• Identify and assign staff to Incident Command System (ICS) roles
		• Assess internal capacity for response, need for ICS and/or external capacity from DOH or CDC
		• Establish documentation standards/processes for the event
		• If LHJ activates into ICS, all resource needs will be identified, evaluated, and monitored
		• LHJ staffing approach depends upon size
			• Provide a representative to integrate into response structure with cooperating agencies to support occupational health and safety education and compliance
			• Exercise regulatory authority to ensure all employers identify hazards or potential hazards at their workplace:
			  • This includes identifying if Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) is necessary to prevent employees from being infected with bird flu
			• Employers with airborne exposure to bird flu must also perform a respiratory exposure evaluation.
			• Exercise regulatory authority to ensure employers evaluate and use engineering and administrative controls, when employees have potential exposure to bird flu, some examples are:
			  • Use ventilation systems that provide a constant supply of fresh air;
			  • Follow state/local health department instructions for quarantine or isolation of exposed or sick workers.
			• Provide guidance to employers for the use of the PPE hazard assessment to determine when employees must wear PPE
			• Provide worker training and exercise regulatory authority to ensure employers require employees to wear a NIOSH-approved respirator and implement a

producer to outline response procedures and expectations • If IMT is activated, have a representative from partner agencies included in WSDA ICS structure to streamline communication for situational awareness, as needed • All resource needs will be identified, evaluated, and monitored by the Incident Management Team(s) (IMT) and requested through the IMT via EMRS or other means as appropriate. • WADDL - One Health efforts around additional animal sampling, conducting sequencing, jointly analyzing sequencing results and developing talking points, etc.		of jurisdiction, available expertise, current workload, and needs required to respond; Local Health Officer maintains oversight over the response and directs key decision-making • Begin preparing outward communications	complete respiratory protection program. • Exercise regulatory authority to ensure employers provide PPE training for workers to ensure they know: When and how to use PPE; How to properly put on, and remove PPE in a separate clean area; How to properly discard disposable PPE; How to maintain and disinfect re-usable PPE, like elastomeric respirators; and the limitations of PPE
Needs of USDA/WSDA	**Needs of DOH**	**Needs of Local Health**	**Needs of L&I**
• Point of contact from LHJ to provide to producers • Point of contact from L&I if index premises is commercial operation • Handout from DOH with resource information including CDC PPE and mental health guidance • Understanding of L&I's expectations for the infected facility for occupational health and safety • Notification of press release or media coverage planned from cooperating agencies (L&I/DOH/LHJ)	• Timely notification of non-negative results to DOH (via Reportable Animal Disease Database (RAD)) • Additional information needs: contact information of producer; flock categorization, estimated depopulation and disposal timeline, planned press releases, epi links • Confirmation from producer has been notified of local public health outreach including anticipated requests from LHJ including a list of potentially exposed employees/ contractors • Integration into response structure with cooperating agencies to support worker health needs	• Timely notification from cooperating agencies. • Sharing of current screening methods with affected individuals • Establishment of communication streams. • Infection control information/resources (copies of written materials/talking points) being shared by WSDA/DOH at detection/prior to detection • Integration into response structure with cooperating agencies to support worker health needs	• Timely notification from cooperating agencies. • Integration into response structure with cooperating agencies to support occupational health and safety education and compliance

Public Information and Media Relations

Communication, both among responders and to the public, is critical for a successful response effort. Effective communication involves briefing the media, public, industry, elected officials, trading partners, and other stakeholders on the status of the outbreak and actions being taken to control and eradicate HPAI. Communication also involves coordinating with Federal, State, and local agencies, Tribal entities, and others to ensure consistent messaging regarding animal health, public health, and food safety. It is imperative that a network of stakeholders and systems for communication are established prior to an HPAI incident.

References and Authorities

USDA APHIS VS / Washington State Department of Agriculture (WSDA) Activities	Washington Dept. of Health (DOH) Activities	Local Health Jurisdiction (LHJ) Activities	Washington Labor & Industries (L&I) Activities
• Coordinate with other agency PIOs for media and press. • Issue press release upon NVSL confirmation of non-negative test results, as applicable (required for new county or new domestic species; not required for backyard flocks in counties that have had a previous detection) • Update informational webpages (self-reporting GIS surveillance map), talking points, tables etc upon NVSL confirmation of non-negative results • Respond to media requests/conduct media interviews • Provide briefings to Governor's Office • Provide situational reports/response updates (frequency and structure dependent on size and scope of response) • Conduct cross-sector briefings with WDFW, WADDL, USDA, Avian Health Lead, State Vet, DOH Office of Communicable Disease Epidemiology as needed. • Enhance and sustain communications outreach campaign through multi-media platforms	• Coordinate with other agency PIOs for media and press. • Provide/maintain up-to-date talking points on human health risks, collaborate/consult with LHJ on external communications • Provide SME on Zoonotic transmission and human HPAI input to media requests that come into DOH • Coordinate One Health communications with partners • Provide accurate person under investigation and human case counts to need-to-know internal programs and chain of command • Keep human case counts of HPAI up-to-date on DOH website	• Coordinate with other agency PIOs for media and press. • Publish provider alerts for local clinic and hospital providers. • Draft notices to local board of health and local decision makers. • Provide up-to-date information to the public. • Communicate activities to local emergency operations center.	• Coordinate with other agency PIOs for media and press.
Needs of USDA/WSDA	**Needs of DOH**	**Needs of Local Health**	**Needs of L&I**
• Awareness of partner agency planned press releases, press conferences and external partner notification prior to issuance • Approved multi-agency talking points • PIO contact from partner agencies	• Approved multi-agency talking points • Awareness of and collaboration on (as needed) other agency's press releases • PIO contact from partner agencies	• Approved multi-agency talking points • Awareness of and collaboration on (as needed) other agency's press releases • PIO contact from partner agencies	• Awareness of and collaboration on (as needed) other agency's press releases • Approved multi-agency talking points • PIO contact from partner agencies

Quarantine/Movement Controls and Enhanced Biosecurity Measures

Swift imposition of effective quarantine and movement controls and stringent and effective biosecurity measures prevent contact between the HPAI virus and susceptible poultry. Quarantine of infected poultry and movement controls in the Infected Zones (IZ) and Buffer Zones (BZ) (which comprise the Control Area [CA]) protect non-infected poultry and minimize exposure risk to non-exposed responders, workers, contractors, and others. There is a serious transmission risk posed by people, material, conveyances, and animals that may have been in contact with HPAI and serve as mechanical vectors. Contact between poultry can be prevented, and transmission risk mitigated through stringent biosecurity and cleaning and disinfection measures.

References and Authorities

USDA APHIS VS / Washington State Department of Agriculture (WSDA) Activities	Washington Dept. of Health (DOH) Activities	Local Health Jurisdiction (LHJ) Activities	Washington Labor & Industries (L&I) Activities
• Backyard flocks will be under quarantine for 120 days to account for fallow period. • Ensure worker safety for USDA/WSDA responders • Ensure WSDA/ USDA responder PPE use and compliance. • Infected commercial operations will be quarantined until virus elimination and environmental testing is complete (approx. 60-120 days) • Epi links quarantined until testing and monitoring is complete • Commercial facilities within the 10KM control area are quarantined and tested until ~two weeks following depopulation and disposal is completed; control area lifted	• Continuation of activities to support farmworker health and safety	• Anticipatory planning on how the LHJ will respond to the community questions and concerns • Assessment of other points of biosecurity risk (i.e. solid waste/compost)	• Continuation of activities to support occupational health and safety education and compliance
Needs of USDA/WSDA	**Needs of DOH**	**Needs of Local Health**	**Needs of L&I**
• Coordination of planned on-site public health/occupational health/safety activities prior to site arrival • Sustained situational awareness of on-site public health visitation/activities and awareness of any changes or issues	• Situational awareness of quarantine timeline and any issues with biosecurity	• Notification and establishment of communication streams from cooperating agencies • Situational awareness of quarantine timeline and any issues with biosecurity	• Situational awareness of quarantine timeline and any issues with biosecurity

Personal Protective Equipment and Exposure Reduction

During an HPAI outbreak, responders are exposed to many hazards. Taking precautions to prevent adverse human health events related to emergency response efforts is important. In an HPAI response, personal protection and safety is particularly essential to protect individuals from HPAI. Personal protective equipment (PPE) is fundamental in ensuring personnel are protected from HPAI, as well as other hazards. All workers involved in the depopulation, transport, or disposal of HPAI virus-infected poultry must be provided with appropriate PPE. All visitors and employees, regardless of their exposure, should be provided with appropriate PPE for their use before entering premises. Proper disposal of PPE is required after leaving.

Prior to visiting an affected farm, contact the appropriate APHIS Area Veterinarian In Charge (AVIC) and State Animal Health Official (SAHO) to coordinate the visit. This pre-visit communication and coordination will ensure all parties are aware of the planned visit, have information about the status of the farm, and understand on-farm biosecurity procedures in accordance with the farm, state, and other agency procedures. No one should enter the premises if exhibiting any symptoms of influenza-like illness.

References and Authorities

USDA APHIS VS / Washington State Department of Agriculture (WSDA) Activities	Washington Dept. of Health (DOH) Activities	Local Health Jurisdiction (LHJ) Activities	Washington Labor & Industries (L&I) Activities
• Ensure worker safety for USDA/WSDA responders • Train WSDA/USDA personnel and/or develop just-in-time training that can be readily available for additional personnel • Ensure WSDA/ USDA responder PPE use and compliance • Provide daily pre-entry safety briefings for all WSDA/USDA response personnel. • Prevent, to every extent possible, adverse human health events involving WSDA/USDA personnel related to emergency response efforts • Ensure that medical monitoring, respiratory protection, and respirator fit testing programs are available for all USDA/WSDA responders. • Ensure that just-in-time medical monitoring and respirator fit testing programs are available for WSDA/USDA sustainment responders. • Brief all WSDA/USDA personnel before any field activities that cover health and safety topics pertinent to incident response • Provide all WSDA/USDA personnel with appropriate PPE and instruction on using it to prevent adverse human health effects during incident response.	• Ensure LHJs have current guidance for PPE and other worker recommendations • Support LHJs as needed in assessing and responding to PPE use or exposure reduction • Create materials for increased awareness of how to decrease exposure • Provide needed PPE items if available in stockpile and employer cannot secure items from market	• Identify PPE resource availability for farm workers. Provide PPE as available • Review PPE use and human infection control practices with farm management • Provide fit-testing support as needed and available • Ensure appropriate fit testing and infection control practices are implemented for responders while testing is pending. • Anticipate quarantine needs, and isolation recommendations. • Contact owners/workers to assess current PPE use and resource needs • Coordinate provision of urgently needed PPE • Provide guidance on PPE use, training resources	• Continuation of activities to support occupational health and safety education and compliance

Needs of USDA/WSDA	Needs of DOH	Needs of Local Health	Needs of L&I
• Partnership with L&I for workplace / employer compliance • Partnership with DOH/ LHJ to identify PPE resources available to the farm • Identify just in time training needed / fit testing • Awareness of L&I's standards/requirements of PPE for farm employees • Assurance of LHJ/DOH's provision of PPE for farm works meets L&I's standards/requirements • Clear and consistent messaging from all cooperating agencies to employer for worker safety • Duty Officer/24 hour answering line phone number for proactive notification to support PPE provision/use. If personnel resources are available, LHJ onsite representative within 24 hours of detection/notification of detection to provide PPE/worker safety technical assistance. • Contact list of all LHJ duty officers / local health officer • Contact information for 24-hour access to L&I if personnel resources are available, L&I onsite representative within 24 hours of detection/notification of detection to provide PPE/worker safety technical assistance • Integration into response structure with cooperating agencies to support worker health needs	• Partnership with LHJ to help identify any issues with PPE use or other exposure reduction practices • Information regarding gaps in PPE availability or use as identified by WSDA/USDA • Clear and consistent messaging from all cooperating agencies to employer for worker safety	• Partnership with L&I for employer/workplace compliance to ensure farm worker safety • Communication of temporary housing if applicable • Clear and consistent messaging from all cooperating agencies to employer for worker safety / Cooperating agencies reiterate and reinforce recommendations provided by LHJ for affected workers • Coordination with affected facility – access for open line of communication with company employees and contractor and contract workers for PPE use, PPE supplies, PPE education/ technical assistance • Information regarding gaps in PPE availability or use as identified by WSDA/USDA	• Awareness of PPE technical assistance needs onsite • Clear and consistent messaging from all cooperating agencies to employer for worker safety • Partnership with cooperating agencies to identify gaps / needs for worker training to ensure employers require employees to wear a NIOSH-approved respirator and implement a complete respiratory protection program

Depopulation

In the event of an HPAI outbreak, euthanasia or mass depopulation should be provided to affected poultry as safely, quickly, efficiently, and humanely as possible. Mass depopulation and euthanasia are not synonymous, and USDA and WSDA recognize a clear distinction. Euthanasia involves transitioning an animal to death as painlessly and stress-free as possible. Mass depopulation is a method by which large numbers of animals must be destroyed quickly and efficiently with as much consideration given to the welfare of animals as practicable, given extenuating circumstances. Mass depopulation may be employed in an HPAI outbreak as a response measure to prevent or mitigate the spread of HPAI through the elimination of infected or potentially infected poultry. Qualified personnel should perform mass depopulation in the event of an HPAI outbreak using the safest, quickest, and most humane procedures available as approved by AVMA. The emotional and psychological impact on animal owners, caretakers, their families, and other personnel should be minimized.

References and Authorities

USDA APHIS VS / Washington State Department of Agriculture (WSDA) Activities	Washington Dept. of Health (DOH) Activities	Local Health Jurisdiction (LHJ) Activities	Washington Labor & Industries (L&I) Activities
24 hours to 8 days (start to completion) • Method of depopulation is determined (CO2, H2H, cervical dislocation, other) • Ensure worker safety for USDA/WSDA responders • Ensure WSDA/ USDA responder PPE use and compliance	• Support LHJ in determining timelines for symptom monitoring	• Continued observance of infection control, disinfection and PPE practices to ensure contact between infected poultry and workers is prevented and transmission risk mitigated • Identify owners/workers involved in depopulation efforts if different from regular employees	• Continuation of activities to support occupational health and safety education and compliance
Needs of USDA/WSDA	**Needs of DOH**	**Needs of Local Health**	**Needs of L&I**
• Daily reports of on-site public health/worker safety visitation/activities and awareness of any changes or issues • Daily situational awareness and notification of number of asymptomatic and symptomatic workers, number of workers tested, number of workers sent home, number of workers treated/hospitalized, number of workers tested positive	• Situational awareness of depopulation timeline	• Coordination with farm management. • Situational awareness of depopulation timeline • Receive up-to-date line lists of staff exposed on-site from owner to continue symptom monitoring and determine length of symptom monitoring period	• Situational awareness of depopulation timeline

Disposal

Appropriate disposal of animal carcasses and materials is a critical component of a successful HPAI response. HPAI can survive for long periods on both organic and inorganic materials. Washington State follow the *USDA APHIS Disposal SOP* to dispose of thousands of bird carcasses, contaminated and potentially contaminated materials, poultry products, items that cannot be properly cleaned and disinfected (such as manure, litter, and bedding), products of the response effort (such as PPE), and products of vaccination response. Disposal occurs as soon as possible after flock depopulation.

References and Authorities

USDA APHIS VS / Washington State Department of Agriculture (WSDA) Activities	Washington Dept. of Health (DOH) Activities	Local Health Jurisdiction (LHJ) Activities	Washington Labor & Industries (L&I) Activities
• Determine method of disposal (composting, incineration, landfill, etc) • Consult with Ecology on disposal methods • Ensure worker safety for USDA/WSDA responders • Ensure WSDA/ USDA responder PPE use and compliance • Consult with Department of Ecology and/or LHJ for landfill disposal per applicable authorities • Consult with solid waste facility for timing and capacity of carcass delivery • Consult with Ecology for commercial on-site disposal options • Notify tribal partners if transport of carcasses involves crossing tribal lands	• Maintain awareness within DOH Environmental public health on a case-by-case basis regarding questions pertaining to drinking water sources depending on disposal options used	• Review destination(s) of materials and methods of disposal for compliance with WAC • Coordinate with USDA/WSDA Case Manager and permitted solid waste facilities to receive waste. • Coordinate with Department of Ecology and WSDA/USDA Case Manager to review composting procedure for compliance with WAC. • Continuation of symptom monitoring of all people exposed; testing and treatment as needed	• Continuation of activities to support occupational health and safety education and compliance
Needs of USDA/WSDA	**Needs of DOH**	**Needs of Local Health**	**Needs of L&I**
• Partnership with Ecology and LHJ for off-site disposal options under applicable authorities • Partnership with Ecology for on-site disposal options under applicable authorities • Situational awareness of daily on-site public health/worker safety visitation/activities and awareness of any changes or issues • Notification of number of asymptomatic/symptomatic workers, number of workers tested, number of workers sent home, number of workers treated/hospitalized, number of workers tested positive	• Situational awareness of disposal plans and timeline	• Situational awareness of disposal plans and timeline • Coordination with onsite agencies and farm re: methods of disposal. • Continued communication about depopulation status. • Situational awareness of disposal plans and timeline • Partnership with USDA/WSDA and Ecology to ensure local ordinances are met • Updated line list of new staff, companies, or contractors involved in disposal	• Situational awareness of disposal plans and timeline

Farm Cleaning and Disinfection / Virus Elimination

HPAI's high survival rate on both organic and inorganic materials requires aggressive cleaning and disinfection practices for both ongoing biosecurity measures to contain the HPAI virus to the infected premises and to eliminate virus from contaminated equipment, materials, and all other fomites. Cleaning and disinfection steps are necessary to control and eliminate HPAI during an outbreak. Any cleaning and disinfection steps on Infected Premises need to account for water and feeding systems, ventilation, slats, nest box material, egg packing machines, egg storage areas, floor areas, the exterior of the house, and other materials and areas must be cleaned and disinfected (this is not an all-inclusive list). Any premises than cannot thoroughly C/D, will be subject to a 120d fallow period.

References and Authorities

USDA APHIS VS / Washington State Department of Agriculture (WSDA) Activities	Washington Dept. of Health (DOH) Activities	Local Health Jurisdiction (LHJ) Activities	Washington Labor & Industries (L&I) Activities
7-21 days (start) • Determine method of disinfection • Ensure worker safety for USDA/WSDA responders • Ensure WSDA/ USDA responder PPE use and compliance	• Ongoing support for LHJ in symptom monitoring, testing and treatment • Support LHJ in determining timelines for symptom monitoring	• Coordinate PPE disinfection practices (goggles, etc.) • Ongoing symptom monitoring, testing and treatment as needed • Determine timelines for symptom monitoring based on dates of last exposure (exposure ends once cleaning and disinfection is complete + 10 days)	• Continuation of activities to support occupational health and safety education and compliance
Needs of USDA/WSDA	**Needs of DOH**	**Needs of Local Health**	**Needs of L&I**
• Daily reports of on-site public health/worker safety visitation/activities and awareness of any changes or issues • Daily situational awareness and notification of number of asymptomatic and symptomatic workers, number of workers tested, number of workers sent home, number of workers treated/hospitalized, number of workers tested positive	• Situational awareness of cleaning and disinfection plans and timeline	• Continued communication about sanitation and disinfection status. • Timeline of cleaning and disinfection to facilitate clear communication on end of symptom monitoring • Receive up-to-date line list of staff exposed, including information on any new staff, companies, or contractors involved in cleaning and disinfection • Confirmation from WSDA/USDA after final cleaning and disinfection is complete	• Situational awareness of cleaning and disinfection plans and timeline

Surveillance / Continuity of Business

Surveillance measures are required for movement of poultry and poultry products for non-infected premises located within 10 km to the infected premises (the restricted area surrounding the infected premises is known as the Control Area). These measures include visual surveillance and monitoring of production parameters, as well as diagnostic testing as specified in the Secure Poultry Supply Plan or directed by the unified IC (USDA/WSDA). Depending on the specific type of movement and item moved, diagnostic testing is often required for 2 days prior to movement; one sample with negative diagnostic results is typically required 24-hours prior to movement

References and Authorities

USDA APHIS VS / Washington State Department of Agriculture (WSDA) Activities	Washington Dept. of Health (DOH) Activities	Local Health Jurisdiction (LHJ) Activities	Washington Labor & Industries (L&I) Activities
• Routine surveillance conducted statewide, on-going indefinitely (NPIP flocks, fair season, auctions) • 24 hours – 120 days for 10km Control Area • Ensure worker safety for USDA/WSDA responders • Activate public facing map for self-reporting. • Monitor Sick Bird Hotline and RAD • Ensure WSDA/ USDA responder PPE use and compliance • Implement enhanced biosecurity plans and Secure Food Plans • Implement permitting procedures per Secure Food Supply for any commercial facility located within the 10KM control area • Test epi-link facilities regardless of location (inside or outside of 10KM control area) • Investigate sick bird reports • Ensure companies under surveillance within the control area have a valid permit, have 2 negative PCR test results with 1 result within 24 hours of product movement to move products out of the control area	• Continuation of activities to support farmworker health	• Continuation of activities to support farmworker health	• Continuation of activities to support occupational health and safety education and compliance
Needs of USDA/WSDA	**Needs of DOH**	**Needs of Local Health**	**Needs of L&I**
• Situational awareness of sick wild bird/peri-domestic reports from WDFW/USDA WS • Daily reports of on-site public health/worker safety visitation/activities and awareness of any changes or issues • Daily situational awareness and notification of	• Situational awareness of surveillance/sampling timeline and results	• Open communication regarding status of animal surveillance outcomes. • Alerts to any new findings that may affect exposure to people	• Situational awareness of surveillance/sampling timeline and results

number of asymptomatic and symptomatic workers, number of workers tested, number of workers sent home, number of workers treated/hospitalized, number of workers tested positive • USDA WS/ WDFW – peri-domestic wildlife/wild bird sampling			

Recovery / Restocking

For premises to restock after HPAI infection, they must meet the minimum time requirements and be approved to restock. Being approved to restock indicates that in addition to finishing all the steps in the restocking process, the premises has met any additional criteria that may have been laid out by the State or APHIS, and that State and APHIS officials agreed in writing that the premises can be restocked.

References and Authorities

USDA APHIS VS / Washington State Department of Agriculture (WSDA) Activities	Washington Dept. of Health (DOH) Activities	Local Health Jurisdiction (LHJ) Activities	Washington Labor & Industries (L&I) Activities
• Conduct biosecurity audit for Infected facility • Release control area • Release quarantine	• Continuation of activities to support farmworker health	• Continuation of activities to support farmworker health	• Continuation of activities to support occupational health and safety education and compliance
Needs of USDA/WSDA	**Needs of DOH**	**Needs of Local Health**	**Needs of L&I**
• Continued situational awareness of and notification of number of asymptomatic and symptomatic workers, number of workers tested, number of workers sent home, number of workers treated/hospitalized, number of workers tested positive	• None	• None	• None

Personnel Testing and Symptom Monitoring/Reporting

People exposed to HPAI A(H5N1)-infected birds or other animals (including people wearing recommended PPE) should be monitored for signs and symptoms of acute respiratory illness beginning after their first exposure and for 10 days after their last exposure. State Health Department officials, including the State Public Health Veterinarian, should collaborate with State Department of Agriculture and State Wildlife officials using a One Health approach when relevant to investigate suspected HPAI A(H5N1) infections in people linked with animals. Rapid detection and characterization of novel influenza A viruses in humans remain critical components of national efforts to prevent further cases, to allow for evaluation of clinical illness associated with them, and to assess the ability of these viruses to spread from human to human.

References and Authorities

USDA APHIS VS / Washington State Department of Agriculture (WSDA) Activities	Washington Dept. of Health (DOH) Activities	Local Health Jurisdiction (LHJ) Activities	Washington Labor & Industries (L&I) Activities
• Follow worker safety protocols including fit testing requirements for all USDA/WSDA responders • Ensure worker safety for USDA/WSDA responders • Ensure WSDA/ USDA responder PPE use and compliance • Provide list of responders to CDC for exposure assessment and symptom monitoring per USDA procedures • Provide list of WSDA responders to DOH for exposure assessment and symptom monitoring • Follow agency procedures for symptom monitoring reporting to primary care physician and LHJ	• Help coordinate access to line list of workers/persons exposed for symptom monitoring • Support LHJ in symptom monitoring of exposed persons which occur daily from notification of detection through 10 days post exposure. • Provide weekly aggregate monitoring reports of monitored people to CDC • Help coordinate specimen collection and transport of anyone who develops symptoms and is tested, report person under investigation to CDC • Ensure LHJ has guidance regarding antiviral medication provision • Public Health Laboratory conducts human novel influenza testing • Coordinate shipment of any H5N1 positive samples from Washington Public Health Lab to the CDC • Track results of human testing, classify cases of human testing results, report results (CDC, World Health Organization0 • Provide accurate person under investigation and human case counts to need-to-know internal programs and chain of command • Support LHJ for isolation guidance for person under investigation	• Establish symptom screening method through coordination with farm leadership. • Monitor exposed workers for symptoms up to 10 days post exposure • Receive reports of symptomatic workers from farm leadership and symptom surveys. • conduct interviews and contact tracing with symptomatic workers. • Assess source and transmission • Establish isolation and quarantine guidelines for suspect cases. Coordinate isolation and quarantine housing as needed • Report notices of symptomatic workers to other coordinating agencies • If any exposed persons are identified in the initial interview as symptomatic, arrange for testing through the LHJ to be sent to Washington Public Health Lab • Coordinate worker testing with farm and workers • Enter specimen information into the Washington Public Health Lab Test Portal. • Coordinate packing and shipping of specimen to Washington Public Health Lab • Establish testing protocol through LHJ, DOH & CDC • Anticipate possible need for onsite testing • Provide directives to community based	• Continuation of activities to support occupational health and safety education and compliance

		medical providers as indicated by response status. • Evaluate necessary supply needs for the response. • Enter specimen information into the Washington Public Health Lab) Test Portal. • Coordinate packing and shipping of specimen to Washington Public Health Lab • Coordinate messaging with equity team. • Develop list of workers/persons possibly exposed for exposure assessment and symptom monitoring, determine indications for chemoprophylaxis • Contact each person possibly exposed to assess exposure and as determined, initiate symptom monitoring, plan for seeking healthcare, plan for testing, plan for provision of PPE if determined needed • Collect specimens from symptomatic persons under monitoring • Complete paperwork and ship specimens to Washington Public Health Lab for H5N1 testing • Communicate isolation guidance or requirements as determined by health officer • Communicate test results and interpretation back to individuals • Coordinate additional follow-up testing (e.g. serum collection) as needed	
Needs of USDA/WSDA	**Needs of DOH**	**Needs of Local Health**	**Needs of L&I**
• Daily reports of on-site public health/worker safety visitation/activities and awareness of any changes or issues • Daily situational awareness and notification of number of asymptomatic and symptomatic workers, number of workers tested, number of workers sent home, number of workers	• Situational awareness of any operational changes that impact who may be exposed, any reports of symptomatic workers, any changes in contact personnel	• Coordination with farm leadership, WSDA/USDA, DOH, CDC • Supplies as noted by internal evaluation. • Access to accurate and timely information on people possibly exposed • Responsiveness from owners/workers via	• Situational awareness of any operational changes that impact who may be exposed, any reports of symptomatic workers, any changes in contact personnel

treated/hospitalized, number of workers tested positive • Assurance from DOH/LHJ that bilingual resources (translation services, printed materials) are provided for workers subject to symptom monitoring and reporting • Understanding of processes or copy of SOP(s) from DOH/LHJ on symptom monitoring and testing		phone/text/survey or alternatively • Access to in-person meetings or visits as need to effectively symptom monitor and test workers	

Prophylaxis

Preventing exposures to highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5N1) viruses, infection prevention and control measures including the use of personal protective equipment, testing, antiviral treatment, patient investigations, monitoring of exposed persons (including persons exposed to sick or dead wild and domesticated animals and livestock with suspected or confirmed infection with highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5N1) virus), and antiviral chemoprophylaxis of exposed persons.

References and Authorities

USDA APHIS VS / Washington State Department of Agriculture (WSDA) Activities	Washington Dept. of Health (DOH) Activities	Local Health Jurisdiction (LHJ) Activities	Washington Labor & Industries (L&I) Activities
• Follow worker safety protocols including Fit testing requirements for all USDA/WSDA responders • Ensure worker safety for USDA/WSDA responders • Ensure WSDA/ USDA responder PPE use and compliance. • Provide list of responders to CDC for exposure assessment and symptom monitoring per USDA procedures • Provide list of WSDA responders to DOH for exposure assessment and symptom monitoring • Follow agency procedures for symptom monitoring reporting to primary care physician and LHJ	• Provide support to LHJ in determining recommendation for chemoprophylaxis based on the situation • Coordinate with medical logistics group within DOH for any supply needs	• Health Officer to consider prophylaxis for those exposed to HPAI within the past 10 days • Coordinate prophylaxis with farm management and exposed workers. • Take inventory of amount of available prophylaxis. • Request additional prophylaxis as necessary to the response. • Establish medication dispensing tracking system • Assess exposure risk to determine need for chemoprophylaxis • Determine resources for access to chemoprophylaxis (standing order, local healthcare facility, LHJ vs DOH stockpile, etc.) • Health education communication to exposed persons, including seasonal influenza vaccine depending on time of season	• Continuation of activities to support occupational health and safety education and compliance
Needs of USDA/WSDA	**Needs of DOH**	**Needs of Local Health**	**Needs of L&I**
• Daily reports of on-site public health/worker safety visitation/activities and awareness of any changes or issues • Daily situational awareness and notification of number of asymptomatic and symptomatic workers, number of workers tested, number of workers sent home, number of workers treated/hospitalized, number of workers tested positive	• None	• Coordination and communication with affected site • Information on exposure risk, PPE access and usage, local influenza activity to determine chemoprophylaxis recommendations • Contact information for household members of a human case to recommend	• None

• Assurance from DOH/LHJ that bilingual resources (translation services, printed materials) are provided for workers subject to prophylaxis issuance • Understanding of prophylaxis guidance processes or copy of SOP(s) from DOH/LHJ		chemoprophylaxis	

HPAI A(H5N1) Virus Infection of Personnel

Workers with high risk of exposure to HPAI A(H5N1) virus [e.g., exposed to animals infected with HPAI A(H5N1) virus who reported not wearing recommended PPE or who experienced a breach in recommended PPE] with signs and symptoms consistent with HPAI A(H5N1) virus infection including acute upper or lower respiratory tract infection, conjunctivitis or gastrointestinal symptoms.

References and Authorities

USDA APHIS VS / Washington State Department of Agriculture (WSDA) Activities	Washington Dept. of Health (DOH) Activities	Local Health Jurisdiction (LHJ) Activities	Washington Labor & Industries (L&I) Activities
• Ensure USDA/WSDA responders follow agency protocols, physician and LHJ guidance for isolation and contact tracing compliance • Triangulate between producer and L&I/LHJ/DOH for assistance in worker safety/public health protective action compliance • Provide a representative to integrate into response structure with cooperating agencies	• Integrate representatives from cooperating agencies into response structure. • Assist LHJ in isolation guidance • Support case investigation and contact tracing as needed • Provide guidance for symptom monitoring of people exposed to the infected person • Notify CDC • Assist CDC with World Health Organization notification for International Health Report • Monitor specimen entry and receipt in Lab Web Portal • Provide accurate person under investigation and human case counts to need-to-know internal programs and chain of command • Notify LHJs and other states of HPAI suspect or positive residents	• Integrate representatives from cooperating agencies into response structure • Conduct interviews and contact tracing with symptomatic workers. • Assess source and transmission. • Establish isolation and quarantine guidelines for suspect cases. Coordinate isolation and quarantine housing as needed. • Report notices of symptomatic workers to other coordinating agencies. • If any exposed persons are identified in the initial interview as symptomatic, arrange for testing with public health lab. • Coordinate worker testing with farm and workers. • Conduct case investigation and contact tracking • Communicate isolation guidance or requirements as determined by health officer • Plan for seeking healthcare • Communicate test results and interpretation back to individuals • Coordinate additional follow-up testing (e.g. serum collection) as needed • Lead external communication regarding identification of human case(s) of H5N1 (e.g., press release, press conference)	• Continuation of activities to support occupational health and safety education and compliance
Needs of USDA/WSDA	**Needs of DOH**	**Needs of Local Health**	**Needs of L&I**
• Awareness of L&I's response actions to address occupational health and safety,	• Situational awareness of any operational changes that impact who may be exposed,	• Accurate names, birthdates, and contact numbers of staff and contracted employees. And	• Situational awareness of any operational changes that impact who

including citations • Awareness of DOH/LHJ's response actions to address public health • Awareness of DOH/LHJ's planned press releases, press conferences and external partner notification prior to issuance	any reports of symptomatic workers, any changes in contact personnel	notification of changes to staff list. • Understanding of organizational structure for the affected site. • Employer(s) communicating to staff the importance of communicating with LHJ and encouraging response submissions. • Responsiveness from contacts of case and continued responsiveness from owners/workers via phone/text/survey • Access to in-person meetings or visits as need to effectively continue symptom monitor and test newly symptomatic workers	may be exposed, any reports of symptomatic workers, any changes in contact personnel

Resources and Information/Data Management

Information management systems at the local, State, Tribal, and Federal level facilitate the collection, management, reporting, analysis, and dissemination of critical emergency response information, and give emergency response providers access to shared, accurate, and timely data needed for decision making. Information including, but not limited to, epidemiological information, diagnostic test results, and resource requests, must be available at intervals as prescribed by Incident Command. Effective information management requires robust information technology systems.

References and Authorities

USDA APHIS VS / Washington State Department of Agriculture (WSDA) Resources and Tools	Washington Dept. of Health (DOH) Resources and Tools	Local Health Jurisdiction (LHJ) Resources and Tools	Washington Labor & Industries (L&I) Resources and Tools
• EMRS HPAI Outbreak Datasheet • USDA APHIS Emergency Management Response System • FAD PReP Manual 3-0 Incident Information Management and Reporting • HPAI Epidemiological Questionnaire • World Organisation for Animal Health Terrestrial Animal Health Code: HPAI • USDA APHIS HPAI Response Plan, Coordinated Public Awareness Campaign • USDA APHIS HPAI Response Plan, Recovery • RAD database • WSDA Animal Tracks **Explanation** • All domestic poultry data will be loaded into USDA's Emergency Management Response System (EMRS), the system of record for all FAD investigations and incidents. • Data will be collected in EMRS to use for outbreak management and data visualization/analysis. • Internal and external situational reports will be developed using USDA APHIS and State templates and data within EMRS; public reporting of the outbreak situation will be coordinated between USDA APHIS and WSDA regulatory officials • Use of EMRS will be critical for negotiating and reestablishing trade • Use of EMRS will be critical to meet	• HPAI exposure assessment tool • HPAI symptom monitoring tool • HPAI premise tracking • RAD reporting tracking • WDRS novel influenza case reporting form **Explanation** • HPAI exposures tracked in REDCap projects which can support automated symptom monitoring and alerts to public health staff • Washington Disease Reporting System (WDRS) used to enter and store public health case investigation data for any human cases of HPAI • Provide epidemiologic curve of HPAI human cases • Establish first and last exposure dates for case monitoring within incubation period of 10 days • Analyze and interpret sequencing results • Developing RedCap project to house RAD report information	• Redcaps symptom monitoring survey. • Event specific data dashboard. • WDRS **Explanation** • Symptom screening surveys entered into DOH REDCap database • Case Investigation and Contact Tracing entered REDCap Database • Specimen collection data entered into DOH Test Request Portal. • Test Results entered into REDCap • Prophylaxis distribution entered into REDCap. • Case and contact information entered into Washington State Disease Reporting (WDRS) immediately upon notice. • Coordinating with DOH and CDC on current data status and updates. • Preparing data for SitRep, press releases, and surveillance. • Enter public health investigation data into WDRS for any human cases of HPAI	• None

international requirements for outbreak management and for the United States to self-declare the entire country, zone, or compartment free of HPAI. • RAD database • Management of data sharing for FAD outbreak is coordinated by USDA APHIS			

Acronyms

APHIS - VS	Animal Plant Health Inspection Service – Veterinary Services
C&D	Cleaning and Disinfection
CDC	Centers for Disease Control
DOH	Washington Department of Health
DOH CD Epi	Office of Communicable Disease Epidemiology
DOH SPHV	Washington Department of Health State Public Health Veterinarian
DOH ZD/VBD	Washington Department of Health Zoonotic and Vector-borne Disease Program
Ecology	Washington State Department of Ecology
EMD	Emergency Management Division
EMRS2	Emergency Management Response System 2.0
EOC	Emergency Operations Center
FAD	Foreign Animal Disease
FAD PReP	Foreign Animal Disease Preparedness and Response Plan
GIS	Geographic Information System
HPAI	Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza
ICS	Incident Command System
IMT	Incident Management Team
JIC	Joint Information Center
LHJ	Local Health Jurisdiction
L&I	Washington Department of Labor and Industries
NAHEMS	National Animal Health Emergency Management System
NAHLN	National Animal Health Laboratory Network
NIOSH	National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
NPIP	National Poultry Improvement Plan
NVSL	National Veterinary Services Laboratory
PCR	Polymerase Chain Reaction
PHL/WAPHL	Washington Public Health Lab
PIO	Public Information Officer
PPE	Personal Protective Equipment
PUI	Person Under Investigation
RAD	Reportable Animal Disease Database
RCW	Revised Code of Washington
REDCap	Research Electronic Data Capture
SEOC	State Emergency Operations Center
SitRep	Situation Report
SME	Subject Matter Expert
SOP	Standard Operating Procedures
USDA	United States Department of Agriculture
APHIS WS	Animal Plant Health Inspection Service - Wildlife Services
WAC	Washington Administrative Code
WADDL	Washington Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory
WDFW	Washington Department of Fish and Wildlife
WDRS	Washington Disease Reporting System
WHO	World Health Organization
WOAH	World Organisation for Animal Health
WSDA	Washington State Department of Agriculture
WSU	Washington State University

Appendix

Detection

References

USDA Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Response Plan the Red Book
- Section 5.2.2 Case Definitions
- Section 5.5. Epi Investigation and Tracing
- Section 5.7. Communications

Authorities

WAC 246-101-805: Duties—Department of agriculture.
WAC 246-101-810: Content of animal case reports—Department of agriculture.
WAC 246-101-515: Handling confidential information—Local health officers and local health jurisdictions.
WAC 246-101-610: Handling of confidential information and information exempt from public disclosure—State health officer and department.
WAC 16-74 Livestock: Testing -Duties of Owners.
Chapter 16-70 WAC: Animal Diseases – Reporting.
RCW 70.02.050: Disclosure without patient's authorization—Need-to-know basis.
RCW 16.36.060: Tests, examinations, inspections, samples, examine and copy records—Entry onto property—Unlawful conduct—Seizure of property—Search warrant.
RCW 42.56.380: Agriculture and livestock.
RCW 16.36.010: – Quarantine – hold order.
RCW 16.36.040: Rules—Prevention—Inspections and tests—Reportable disease—Federal regulations.
RCW 16.36.080: Veterinarians and others to report diseases -Director's duties-Unlawful importation.
Code of Federal Regulations Title 5 Chapter C Part 10000 Business Information.

Public Information and Media Relations

References

Authorities

WAC 246-101-805: Duties—Department of agriculture.
WAC 246-101-810: Content of animal case reports—Department of agriculture.
WAC 246-101-515: Handling confidential information—Local health officers and local health jurisdictions.
WAC 246-101-610: Handling of confidential information and information exempt from public disclosure—State health officer and department.

Quarantine/Movement Controls and Enhanced Biosecurity Measures

References

Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Emergency Response
USDA Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Response Plan the Red Book
- Section 9 - Biosecurity
- Section 10 - Quarantine and Movement Control

Authorities

RCW 16.36.010: - Quarantine – hold order.
RCW 42.56.380: Agriculture and livestock.
RCW 70.02.050: Disclosure without patient's authorization—Need-to-know basis.
Code of Federal Regulations Title 5 Chapter C Part 10000 Business Information.

Personal Protective Equipment and Exposure Reduction

References

USDA APHIS HPAI PPE Recommendations
Reducing Exposure for Workers to Avian Influenza A Viruses
Information for Workers Exposed to H5N1 Bird Flu
USDA Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Response Plan the Red Book
- Section 9 - Biosecurity

Labor and Industries Respirator Safety

Authorities

RCW 42.56.380: Agriculture and livestock.
RCW 70.02.050: Disclosure without patient's authorization—Need-to-know basis.
Code of Federal Regulations Title 5 Chapter C Part 10000 Business Information.
WAC 296-800-110: Employer responsibilities.
WAC 296-800-160: PPE
Chapter 296-842 WAC: Respirators
Chapter 296-307 WAC: Safety Standard for Agriculture
12.00 DOSH - Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Directive

Depopulation

References

USDA Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Emergency Response
USDA Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Response Plan the Red Book
- Section 5.14 - Disposal

Authorities

RCW 42.56.380: Agriculture and livestock.
RCW 70.02.050: Disclosure without patient's authorization—Need-to-know basis.
Chapter 16.36 RCW: Animal Health
RCW 16.36.090: Destruction of diseased or quarantined animals.
RCW 16.36.096: Destruction of animals—Payment of indemnity.
Code of Federal Regulations Title 5 Chapter C Part 10000 Business Information.
12.00 DOSH - Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Directive

Disposal

References

USDA Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Emergency Response
USDA Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Response Plan the Red Book
Section 5.14 – Disposal
Mortality Composting Protocol for Avian Influenza-Infected Flocks;
USDA Carcass Management
Routine Animal Mortality Carcass Disposal Manual 2022
Routine Animal Mortality Carcass Disposal Manual - Spanish
Catastrophic Animal Mortality Management Guidance
Catastrophic Animal Mortality Management Guidance - Spanish
Carcass Disposal Options for Animal Mortality Events (Interactive Map)
USDA APHIS Carcass Management Dashboard
USDA APHIS Emergency Carcass Management Response Process
USDA APHIS Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) Depopulation and Disposal
USDA Carcass Management Calculator (v.1.3)

Authorities

Chapter 70A.205 RCW: SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT—REDUCTION AND RECYCLING
Chapter 173-350 WAC: SOLID WASTE HANDLING STANDARDS
RCW 42.56.380: Agriculture and livestock.
WAC 246-203-121: Disposal of Dead Animals.
Chapter 16.68 RCW: Dispositions: DISPOSAL OF DEAD ANIMALS.
RCW 70.02.050: Disclosure without patient's authorization—Need-to-know basis.
Code of Federal Regulations Title 5 Chapter C Part 10000 Business Information.
RCW 16.36.102: Duty to bury carcass of diseased livestock – dead livestock presumed diseased.
WAC 16-25: Disposal of Dead Livestock.

Farm Cleaning and Disinfection / Virus Elimination

References

USDA Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Emergency Response
USDA Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Response Plan the Red Book
Section 5.15 – Cleaning and Disinfection

Authorities

RCW 42.56.380: Agriculture and livestock.
RCW 70.02.050: Disclosure without patient's authorization—Need-to-know basis.
Code of Federal Regulations Title 5 Chapter C Part 10000 Business Information.
12.00 DOSH - Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Directive

Surveillance / Continuity of Business

References

Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Emergency Response
Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Response Plan the Red Book
Section 5.3 - Surveillance
Section 5.10.6 - Surveillance Required for Poultry and Poultry Product Movement
Section 5.11 - Continuity of Business

Authorities

RCW 42.56.380: Agriculture and livestock.
RCW 70.02.050: Disclosure without patient's authorization—Need-to-know basis.
Secure Poultry Supply Plan
RCW 16.36.010: Quarantine-hold Order.
RCW 16.36.040: Rules—Prevention—Inspections and tests—Reportable disease—Federal regulations.
Code of Federal Regulations Title 5 Chapter C Part 10000 Business Information.

Recovery / Restocking

References

Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Response Plan the Red Book
Section 6.1.4 - Release of Quarantine and Movement Control
Section 6.2 - Restocking
Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Emergency Response

Personnel Testing and Symptom Monitoring/Reporting

References

Interim Guidance on Influenza Antiviral Post-exposure Prophylaxis of Persons Exposed to Birds or Other Animals with Novel Influenza A Viruses Associated with Severe Human Disease or with the Potential to Cause Severe Human Disease
Laboratory and Testing Information for Novel Influenza A Viruses
Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A(H5N1) Virus: Interim Recommendations for Prevention, Monitoring, and Public Health Investigations
Influenza—Novel or Unsubtypeable Strain

Authorities

Legal and Regulatory Framework for Emergency Public Health Medical Response
RCW 70.05.070: Local health officer—Powers and duties.
12.00 DOSH - Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Directive

Prophylaxis

References

Interim Guidance on Influenza Antiviral Post-exposure Prophylaxis of Persons Exposed to Birds or Other Animals with Novel Influenza A Viruses Associated with Severe Human Disease or with the Potential to Cause Severe Human Disease

Authorities

Legal and Regulatory Framework for Emergency Public Health Medical Response
RCW 70.05.070: Local health officer—Powers and duties.

HPAI A(H5N1) Virus Infection of Personnel

References

CDC Human Infection with Novel Influenza A Virus Case Report Form
Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A(H5N1) Virus: Interim Recommendations for Prevention, Monitoring, and Public Health Investigations
Interim Guidance on Specimen Collection and Testing for Patients with Suspected Infection with Novel Influenza A Viruses Associated with Severe Disease or with the Potential to Cause Severe Disease in Humans | Bird Flu | CDC
Influenza Virus Testing at the Washington Public Health Laboratories (WAPHL)
CDC-NovelA-CaseReportForm.docx

Authorities

Legal and Regulatory Framework for Emergency Public Health Medical Response
RCW 70.05.070: Local health officer—Powers and duties.

Resources and Information/Data Management

References

USDA Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Response Plan the Red Book Section 5.6 Information Management
National Response Framework
National Incident Management System
Washington State Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan

Template Instructions

This document can be used as a template to facilitate an interactive process that fosters working across organizational and disciplinary lines when preparing or responding to animal disease outbreaks or addressing other complex One Health challenges. While Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza is the focus of this document, the template can create a practical, easy to use and readily transferable framework to effectively tackle human, animal and environmental cross-disciplinary challenges.

The critical response activities used for the cross-sector mapping process should be selected to address the disease specific goals and demands of each Foreign Animal Disease response or other complex One Health challenge. The critical activities highlighted in this document are crucial in a multi-agency animal health emergency but are not all-inclusive of all activities occurring during a response.

- Critical activities of ultimate importance in a Foreign Animal Disease response include:
    - Information and media relations
    - Quarantine and enhanced biosecurity measures
    - Personal protective equipment and exposure reduction
    - Depopulation
    - Disposal
    - Farm cleaning, disinfection and virus elimination
    - Surveillance and continuity of business
    - Recovery and restocking
- For complex One Health challenges, critical activities with an emphasis on occupational health should also be discussed:
    - Personnel testing
    - Symptom monitoring and reporting
    - Prophylaxis
    - Spill-over infection of personnel

Personnel responsible for the management of the event are encouraged to be the primary representative from all participating agencies or organizations. Field staff and experts responsible for on-site operations should be consulted for technical assistance and subject matter expertise.

Each organization participating in the mapping process should complete the ‘swim lane’ or column for their agency for each critical activity to document science- and risk-based approaches that will work to protect public health and the environment, and stabilize animal agriculture, the food supply, and the economy in an animal health emergency. Relevant references and regulatory authorities policies/laws should be provided for each critical activity.

1) In the first box within your agency lane, identify the actions, roles, and responsibilities for your organization during a response to HPAI, other Foreign Animal Disease, or a complex One Health challenge. Include relevant jurisdictional authorities that support the activities taken by your organization during each response phase. Avoid including planning assumptions of other organizations or actions you think should happen. Indicate ‘N/A’ if the critical activity does not apply to your organization.
2) In the second box within your agency lane, identify the information or resource needs your agency has of other responding agencies. If there are no needs for your organization during that critical activity, indicate ‘none.’

The outcome of this activity supports preparedness and capacity building, developing just in time training for responses, and after the fact analysis.