Overview
The objective of this local jurisdiction guide is to provide counties with information to develop Emergency Support Function 11 to their local plans in the event of a Foreign Animal Disease (FAD) outbreak requiring their response.

This guide provides information on the roles and responsibilities for response to a FAD and outlines local jurisdiction, tribal, state, and federal interagency coordination and cooperation. This coordination and cooperation will be essential to responding rapidly to any threat to Washington’s livestock and poultry industries.

Purpose and Scope
The purpose of this guide is to assist the local jurisdictions develop their local jurisdiction Emergency Operations Plan or Emergency Management Plan including procedures for a response to an actual or impending FAD outbreak. The guide is built upon support rather than response because in the case of a FAD, response authorities are held by the Washington State Department of Agriculture (WSDA) and support to effectively respond to the outbreak is needed from the impacted local jurisdiction and mutual aid partners.

This guide does not apply to animals which are abandoned or neglected and those injured or killed by natural or technological disasters. Responses to these events are the responsibility of the local or tribal government. For these instances, WSDA will be the supporting agency for these responses and is available to provide technical assistance and coordination for the response when requested.

Planning Assumptions
Some FADs may require only a limited response and may be routinely handled by state/federal animal health resources employed by WSDA and USDA. Other FADs, such as Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) or Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI), may totally overwhelm these agencies and their resources and will require the full resources of the emergency management system within Washington State. In the event Washington is not the first state to be impacted by the outbreak, and the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) and National Response Framework (NRF) resources may be already in short supply and local resources will be all the more important to the response to the outbreak.

The plan developed should encompass and incorporate local, state, tribal, and federal resources as well as the private industry in your local jurisdiction.
Washington State Department of Agriculture (WSDA) Actions

This serves as a brief description of the Washington State Department of Agriculture’s (WSDA) role in animal health and disease control in a foreign animal disease outbreak. The purpose is to continue to foster a cooperative relationship between local, state, and federal emergency management and encourage communication between agencies.

The unusual aspect of an emergency response in a foreign animal disease outbreak is that the State Veterinarian’s office receives first notification. The response is initiated by the state animal health authorities, rather than local authorities requesting support from the state. Due to the technical expertise needed and the international scope of consequences, the event quickly involves multiple agencies. It is expected to quickly escalate to implement the Multi-Agency Coordination System.

As a reminder, there are several resources available at the Washington Emergency Management Division’s web site at http://mil.wa.gov/emergency-management-division. Click on the plans button in the Quick Links section of the home page, and scroll down to access the Washington Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan, Emergency Support Function (ESF) #11, or go directly at http://mil.wa.gov/other-links/plans.

Situation

The Initial Response
The WSDA and United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) Veterinary Services (VS) and the involved local jurisdiction form a unified command with responsibility and authority for animal health and animal disease. The Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostician (FADD) becomes the initial Incident Commander until the Unified Command is implemented. WSDA has implemented and exercised its Incident Command System.

As the incident expands, a Delegation of Authority may be made to one of the local (Type III) or state (Type II) Incident Management Teams (IMT) to manage the incident or outbreak. This delegation would free up veterinary resources in the Incident Command Structure for field operations in support of the response. As USDA becomes more involved in the response, this may transition to a federal (Type I) IMT.

Decisions on animal disease control, such as areas of livestock quarantine, and timing/method of livestock depopulation, will be made by specially trained animal health officials from WSDA and USDA. Decisions involving the utilization and coordination of local resources are made by
the Unified Command of which the local jurisdiction is a part. The local Emergency Operations Center (EOC) will support the Unified Command along with the State EOC.

The event begins with a report to the State Veterinarian or the USDA/APHIS Assistant District Direct (ADD). The report is prompted by the recognition of sick livestock showing signs of a potential foreign animal disease. A state or federal Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostician (FADD) will be dispatched to investigate and collect split samples for diagnosis. If the clinical signs are highly suspicious of a foreign animal disease, the Washington Emergency Management Division (EMD) may be contacted and may assist in emergency transport of the diagnostic samples to the WSU and USDA laboratory. Also, if the situation is highly suspicious of a foreign animal disease, the WSDA EOC will be contacting state and local emergency management to begin preparations. Depending on the circumstances, state and local officials may decide to open their EOCs.

The Unified Response
The first step is recognition of the disease. The next steps involve containment and eradication. A foreign animal disease outbreak is likely to involve multiple herds. The response is expected to necessitate a large quarantine area such as one or more counties and strict biosecurity measures to prevent the spread of the disease.

The livestock quarantine issued by WSDA and enforced by state and local law enforcement will prevent the movement of animals that could be carriers or could be infected. This quarantine could require the local jurisdiction to develop an Emergency Declaration for the county, due to the resource requirements to support the expanding response. Once the disease is confirmed by the laboratory, the Governor may be asked to issue an Emergency Proclamation. This proclamation may occur before a local emergency is declared. The Governor’s Emergency Proclamation could make emergency funds available, and may specify directives which supersede some laws and regulations. All outbreak responses will be handled very differently and will vary by the disease, number of animals and type of assistance available. But as an example, to prevent the spread of the disease, law enforcement may be given the power to restrict movement in and out of the quarantine zone. The State Veterinarian may issue a “Stop Movement Order” to include all animals in transit within a wide geographic area. This may be like the grounding of airplanes at 9/11, until the investigation clarifies the extent of the infection and determines which animals can safely move. Although Foot-and-Mouth Disease (FMD) Virus, for example, causes disease in “cloven hoofed” animals, horses and other animals may carry the virus on them, so all animals may be under a “Stop Movement Order” for a time. It is expected that our neighboring states will close their borders to livestock entering from Washington. Care and shelter may be
required for some animals in transit that must be temporarily unloaded. State and federal wildlife officials will minimize the spread of disease by wildlife.

Access points will be identified to allow people to leave a quarantine zone without spreading the disease (for example, ask them to wear freshly laundered clothes and disinfect footwear as they exit the zone). Cleaning and disinfection facilities will need to be located at these access points. Due to the time consuming effort to clean and disinfect vehicles, vehicular traffic in and out of the quarantine zone should be severely limited. All responders who could potentially be contaminated by the disease causing organism will need to take special precautions not to contaminate other areas or other livestock, even if still within the quarantine zone. This is like being splattered by wet paint while painting the living room, and avoiding the transfer of the wet paint elsewhere. Care is taken to avoid transfer of the wet paint both inside and outside the house. Some level of protective clothing will be necessary. That may consist of washable or disposable coveralls and boots which can be thrown away, or cleaned and disinfected. The
local, state and even the federal government may run short of “clean” responders, so our personnel will need to be utilized efficiently.

WSDA has trained the Reserve Veterinary Corps (RVC) to assist in a foreign animal disease outbreak. These volunteers comprise a portion of the personnel surge capacity. They are considered a state resource under the direction of WSDA. If deployed, they would report to a staging area where WSDA would assemble them into animal health teams, provide an assignment and location of operation.

One of the many phases of the operation where the RVC may contribute involves tracing of potentially exposed animals from contact or linked premises. A contact premises would include farms/ranches/facilities adjacent to infected herds. Linked premises would include farms/ranches/facilities identified as linked by animal or animal product movement from an infected herd. These would also include premises which could have been exposed to contaminated equipment, vehicles or even contaminated people. This investigation involving trace back and trace forward will take time. The premises registration program could make this task easier.

USDA can also provide additional trained federal responders. The National Animal Health Emergency Response Corps (NAHERC) can be deployed on short notice. There is concern that if Washington is not the first site of infection, NAHERC responders may already be deployed elsewhere.

The eradication of a foreign animal disease necessitates the depopulation of infected and exposed susceptible livestock. A strict protocol needs to be followed for livestock owners to be eligible for indemnity from USDA for livestock depopulated as part of the emergency response. The protocol involves an appraisal based on fair market value, and agreed upon by the owner prior to euthanasia. USDA representatives will conduct the appraisals. Owners will not be reimbursed for animals that have succumbed to the disease. It is in the owner’s best interest to report sick animals as soon as possible. Depopulation will be carried out by trained responders in a humane manner.

There are several possible methods of carcass disposal. In most areas of Washington, burial may be the method of choice. The Washington Department Ecology (DOE), local environmental health officers, and other environmental authorities will provide guidance on environmentally
sound burial locations. Some counties and some production facilities may have predetermined burial locations identified on site. DOE and local environmental health officers may have guided the choice of that location. The transportation of infected carcasses risks further contamination. If transportation is necessary, it requires intense biosecurity measures. Other methods of disposal such as incineration and composting will also need to be considered. Besides cleaning and disinfection, most viruses, such as the Foot-and-Mouth Disease virus, are killed by heat, drying, and a change in pH. The virus dies as a carcass decomposes, so temporary burial with relocation later once the virus is no longer a threat, may be another option considered.

The lifting of quarantines by WSDA and USDA will be after depopulation of affected animals and after all disease specific mitigations are met as outlined in the WSDA and/or USDA disease response plans. Unnecessary delay must be avoided for the community and the nation to get back to normal activities.

It is important to understand that the State EOC’s Joint Information Center (JIC) would be activated very early to provide consistent messages, credible information, and support in a real event.

Partnering with the State EOC’s JIC and sharing information will assure consistent public information and rumor control. It is important that local emergency management is able to communicate the message to their community. The State EOC’s JIC will assist with the development of scientifically correct technical messages. Methods of enhanced biosecurity must be explained to producers. Public confidence in government and consumer confidence in the food supply must be maintained. Press releases, media interviews, cooperation with local public information officers, and a special dedicated web site will be utilized at the state level to provide the most current public information. This situation will be fluid, including rapidly changing quarantine zones, as the situation progresses.

In a foreign animal disease outbreak, there will be significant economic loss. Producers will suffer financially due to lack of production. Allied businesses will suffer losses due to the ripple effect. Unemployment will be high, mortgages will be foreclosed, customers will be lost forever, and most everyone will be affected in some way. Stress on whole communities will be unavoidable. Although USDA has disaster assistance programs to help with financial challenges, the mental
health of communities cannot be ignored. Behavioral health counseling, as part of public health, will be a significant component of any recovery effort. The FMD virus is not a public health concern, but some other foreign animal diseases are. The public will need appropriate information.

**Local Jurisdiction Support**

In contrast to the initial local emergency response to a fire, flood, or tornado, a FAD response requires an initial rapid and coordinated state level response. Other than the responsibility to minimize the impact on its citizens from an FAD event, no authority to command or manage an FAD response including quarantine of livestock or poultry premises, depopulation of affected or potentially-affected premises and indemnification for taken animals or products exists at the local jurisdiction level.

Local jurisdiction emergency management and traditional first responders have a crucial role in this emergency response. WSDA is looking forward to more discussion to enhance our coordination. You are most familiar with your local resources.

Depending on the scope of the incident, the county EOC may be activated to support the Incident Command Post (ICP). Local resources may be requested to help determine the ICP location and to provide personnel and resources to fill out the response organization with tactical and support resources. The kinds of resources requested may range from agricultural outreach specialists to animal handlers, GIS expertise, to excavation equipment and operators to clerks. How and where resources are used on the incident will be determined by the IMT based on the incident objectives.

During an FAD outbreak there will be varied operations going on throughout the county. The core local/county emergency planning and response activities, usually to include the first 72 hours of a response, include but may not be limited to: site security/traffic control, carcass disposal, and resource identification.

As with other emergencies, your initial response may include conducting an inventory of local resources such as:

- Maps of the region from Public Works or Planning Department
- Use of local emergency trailers to haul and store response equipment
- Potential staging areas (to include hotel/housing for 200+ agricultural responders, restaurants or food service, an open warehouse of 10,000+ sq ft to store equipment, PPE, supplies from the NVS) from Public Works
- Road signage for stopping and rerouting traffic from Public Works
- Law enforcement personnel to control traffic, to assist in manning control points and maintaining order from the State Patrol, Sheriff or Police Department
- Local Public Information Officer support from the local jurisdiction and Public Health
- Heavy equipment to facilitate burial of carcasses and organic material from Public Works or local contractor
- Local landfill capabilities, and ground water information required for carcass disposal from Public Works and local Public Health
- Firefighting-HAZMAT equipment and personnel to establish cleaning and disinfection stations on control points from local fire districts
- Facility suitable for an incident command post to include communication capability from local emergency management
- Truck washes from Public Works
- Industrial equipment and suppliers from local jurisdiction Logistics
- Laundromat facilities from local jurisdiction Logistics
- Voluntary organizations that may be asked to provide food, water, mobile sanitary facilities, and guides for responders not familiar with the area
- Location of livestock, especially large concentrated animal feeding operations (CAFOs)
- Weather information including wind direction from local emergency management
- Consumables such as gasoline from local jurisdiction Logistics
- Vehicle/equipment rental and repair facilities from local jurisdiction Logistics

Other state resources and agencies will be asked to support this effort.

A guide to local, tribal, and state agencies on what is required to establish the quarantine zones for an outbreak and conduct planning for this type is “A Guide to Traffic Control of Rural Roads in an Agricultural Emergency”. This report provides information for local and tribal responders on what is required to control traffic in a FAD incident.

**Private Sector**

Many activities involved in responding and recovering from a FAD outbreak will be contracted with private enterprise. Contracted activities may include animal appraisal, euthanasia, disposal and cleaning and disinfection.

Private organizations such as producers, producer organizations, auction markets, slaughtering establishments, and renderers have a significant interest in a response plan of this type because their livelihood may depend upon the outcome. These enterprises will be notified by WSDA or
designees from when an animal disease emergency exists. They will be encouraged to actively participate in an emergency response. Their resources and expertise will be indispensable in disease control and eradication efforts.

A crucial role for professional organizations and businesses will involve communication. It is expected that organizations within the agriculture community will actively seek a role in gathering information from State and Federal authorities, disseminating that information to their members, providing information from members to policy-makers as requested, and providing joint government/industry statements to the media. Professional organizations should have communication rosters and mechanisms in place to accomplish this role. WSDA will notify other organizations as appropriate.

Local stakeholders will play a key role in a FAD response

**United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) Actions**

USDA would play a significant role in the response from the first discovery of the disease. They are a partner agency and do first response to FAD incidents and outbreaks. USDA and WSDA would be the initial Unified Command on scene until the local jurisdiction and state are notified and their assistance and support is required.

The US Secretary of Agriculture has broad authorities and discretion for responding to and eliminating an animal disease. In connection with an emergency (not necessarily under a declaration of an Emergency) under which a disease of livestock threatens any segment of agricultural production in the United States, the Secretary may restrict animal movement involving interstate commerce and/or international trade and cross border movement with Canada and Mexico, and provide funding for certain Federal, State, and local response activities.

Numerous Federal agencies have authorities and responsibilities related to public, animal, and wildlife health, safety, and management. Many of these authorities include significant levels of discretion and may or may not be applied to an FAD response depending on the scope and magnitude of an outbreak.

**Veterinary Services**

The USDA/APHIS Veterinary Service may provide a part of the initial response from the Veterinary Services Office located in Washington State. Coordinating directly with the State Veterinarian, the Assistant Director can deploy USDA/APHIS veterinarians to the scene and begin the federal response to an outbreak.

**National Veterinary Stockpile**

WSDA will coordinate with the USDA-APHIS to provide the veterinary countermeasures (supplies, equipment, field tests, vaccines, and response support services) that will need to respond to catastrophic animal disease outbreaks.
In 2004, the Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9 was established to protect our nation’s food supply by stockpiling countermeasures against the 17 most damaging animal diseases and establishing protocols to deploy these countermeasures within 24 hours to the impacted areas. This directive reflected the national concern that terrorists could simultaneously release catastrophic animal diseases in multiple locations and would quickly deplete state and industry resources and overwhelm the private sector’s ability to support a disease response.

Goals

- To deploy countermeasures against the most economically devastating animal diseases including Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza, Foot-and-Mouth Disease, Rift Valley Fever, Exotic Newcastle Disease, and Classical Swine Fever.
- To help jurisdictions plan for, train, and exercise the rapid acquisition, receipt, processing, and distribution of the National Veterinary Stockpile countermeasures during an event.

NVS Countermeasures

- Vaccines and high speed vaccination equipment to protect animal populations during outbreaks.
- Personal Protective Equipment to provide bio-security and protect people and stop the spread of the disease.
- Animal handling and depopulation equipment to humanely and efficiently handle animals during outbreaks.
- Field diagnostic tests for rapid, presumptive identification of the disease.
- Decontamination supplies to eliminate disease agents.
- Response support services, including emergency transportation of supplies, equipment, vaccines, reagents, samples, and personnel to support response efforts.

In Summary

This guide provides basic, high level information on the roles and responsibilities for response to a FAD outbreak and outlines local jurisdiction, tribal, state, and federal interagency coordination and cooperation. This coordination and cooperation will be essential to responding rapidly to any threat to Washington’s livestock and poultry industries.
Appendix A: References


